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This dissertation is composed of three essays covering two areas of interest.
The first topic is personal transportation demand with a focus on price and fuel
efficiency elasticities of mileage demand, challenging assumptions common in the
rebound effect literature. The second topic is consumer finance with a focus on
small loans.
The first chapter creates separate variables for fuel prices during periods of
increasing and decreasing prices as well as an observed fuel economy measure to
empirically test the equivalence of these elasticities. Using a panel from Germany
from 1997 to 2009 I find a fuel economy elasticity of mileage of 53.3%, which is
significantly different from the gas price elasticity of mileage during periods of de-
creasing gas prices, 4.8%. I reject the null hypothesis or price symmetry, with the
elasticity of mileage during period of increasing gas prices ranging from 26.2% and
28.9%.
The second chapter explores the potential for the rebound effect to vary with
income. Panel data from U.S. households from 1997 to 2003 is used to estimate the
rebound effect in a median regression. The estimated rebound effect independent
of income ranges from 17.8% to 23.6%. An interaction of income and fuel economy
is negative and significant, indicating that the rebound effect may be much higher
for low income individuals and decreases with income; the rebound effect for low
income households ranged from 80.3% to 105.0%, indicating that such households
may increase gasoline consumption given an improvement in fuel economy.
The final chapter documents the costs of credit instruments found in major
mail order catalogs throughout the 20th century. This study constructs a new
dataset and finds that the cost of credit increased and became stickier as mail
order retailers switched from an installment-style closed-end loan to a revolving-style
credit card. This study argues that revolving credit’s ability to decrease salience of
credit costs in the price of goods is the best explanation for rate stickiness in the
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Government policies often have unintended consequences, both positive and
negative. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, for example,
aim to reduce fuel consumption by increasing fuel economy, but the reduced cost to
drive may cause some drivers to increase their miles driven following an improvement
in efficiency, a phenomenon known as the rebound effect. As another example, the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968 was intended to protect consumers by allowing
for easier comparison of credit instruments through the use of one common interest
rate, the annual percentage rate (APR). This regulation may have influenced interest
rates themselves, or if it constrained competition between lenders through the cost
of credit, may have induced changes in product prices. This work provides insight
into the effects of these policies.
This proposal is composed of three essays covering two areas of interest. The
first topic is personal transportation demand with a focus on price and fuel efficiency
elasticities of mileage demand. The second topic is consumer finance with a focus
on small dollar loans for nondurable goods.
Mileage elasticities have received much interest in the economic literature,
especially since the Arab Oil Embargo in the 1970s. In this expansive literature
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authors make a variety of assumptions regarding consumer responses to changes in
important policies such as gasoline taxes and the CAFE standards which regulate
fuel economy. I am particularly interested in assumptions commonly made in the
literature on the “rebound effect”, specifically i) that consumers respond equally to
increasing and decreasing oil prices, ii) that households respond in the same way
to changes in fuel economy as to changes in fuel prices, and iii) that households of
different income levels respond equally to changes in fuel economy. This research
strives to test these assumptions empirically. In my first essay, I allow for an asym-
metric household response to fuel prices by decomposing fuel price into a decreasing
price variable, historical price maximum, and price increase below the historical
maximum. I then compare these elasticities to an elasticity of mileage with respect
to fuel economy. In my second essay, through the inclusion of an interaction term,
I allow for households of varying income levels to react differently to fuel economy
improvements.
Although many studies examine loans for large durable items such as automo-
biles and mortgages, smaller installment loans receive little attention. Quantitative
investigation of small dollar loans is almost nonexistent. In my final essay, my coau-
thor, Dr. Mary Zaki, and I explore the effects of providing the APR on the cost of
credit to consumers and argue that disclosure of the APR did not increase public
understanding of the cost of credit.
In the first essay, “The Household Response to Increasing Fuel Prices, Decreas-
ing Fuel Prices, and Fuel Economy,” I develop an empirical framework in which to
compare fuel economy standards to fuel taxes, as well as the potential for these
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policies to induce an increase in miles driven. I examine the equivalence of the
response to fuel economy and fuel prices and test for an asymmetric response to
prices. A panel dataset from Germany from 1997 to 2009 provides me with a unique
opportunity to estimate household-level mileage elasticity outside of the U.S. I use
observed fuel economy (rather than manufacturer specs), and create separate vari-
ables for fuel prices during periods of increasing and decreasing prices to empirically
test these assumptions. I find an overall fuel economy elasticity of mileage of which
is significantly different than the gas price elasticity of mileage during periods of
decreasing gas prices. I could also reject the null hypothesis of price symmetry.
My second essay, “Does the Rebound Effect Vary With Income? A Microdata
Study,” deals more explicitly with the rebound effect, the magnitude of the increase
in miles driven following an improvement in fuel efficiency. This study explores
the potential for the rebound effect to vary with income. Panel data from U.S.
households from 1997 to 2003 is used to estimate the rebound effect in a median
regression. The estimated rebound effect independent of income ranges from 17.8%
to 23.6% in the median regressions. An interaction of income and fuel economy is
negative and significant, indicating that the rebound effect may be much higher for
low income individuals and decreases with income. In the baseline median regres-
sions, the rebound effect for low income households was large enough to indicate
that such households may increase gasoline consumption given an improvement in
fuel economy.
The final essay, “Historical Cost of Consumer Credit, Interest Rate Stickiness
and Salience: Evidence from Mail Order Catalogs” documents the costs of credit
3
instruments found in major mail order catalogs from the 1920s through the 1990s.
We construct a new dataset and find that the cost of credit generally increased
and became stickier as mail order retailers switched from an installment-style plan
(closed-end loan) to a revolving-style plan (credit card). Subsequently, interest rates
on major sources of revolving credit remained sticky in the market for the next 30
years. Previous works have attributed credit card interest rate stickiness, which
became evident in the 1980s, to search costs, switching costs and adverse selection.
Some of these explanations are more applicable to the mail order catalog setting
than others. This study adds revolving credit’s ability to decrease salience of credit
costs in the price of goods as another explanation for rate stickiness as well as for
the preference of this form of credit over closed-end credit among retailers.
Section 2 presents the first essay regarding an asymmetric response to prices
and the equivalence of the fuel economy elasticity of mileage and the fuel price
elasticity of mileage. Section 3, contains the second essay, which examines whether
consumers of different income levels respond differently to changes in fuel economy.
Finally, Section 4 includes the final essay regarding the cost of credit for small dollar
installment loans.
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Chapter 2: The Household Response to Increasing Fuel Prices, De-
creasing Fuel Prices, and Fuel Economy
2.1 Introduction
Many governments are using vehicle regulations in an effort to reduce the
greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change. In the US the CAFE
standards are used to reduce fuel consumption by increasing fuel economy. Specif-
ically, each auto manufacturer must meet a certain production-weighted harmonic
mean fuel economy across their current model year fleet. This regulation was first
introduced in 1975 in response to the Arab Oil Embargo and quickly led to myriad
studies on the effect of the standards on fuel consumption and miles driven. 1 Of
course, many other aspects of the CAFE standards have also been studied such as
the effect on auto manufacturers,2 the cost of the standards passed on to consumers,3
the impact of tightening the standards,4 and the effect of CAFE on vehicle safety.5
1Mayo and Mathis (1988); Greene (1992); Yee (1991); Goldberg (1998); Greene et al. (1999);
West (2004); Small and Van Dender (2007); Frondel et al. (2008); Greene (2012); Goulder et al.
(2012); Jacobsen (2013a) to name a few.
2Goldberg (1998); Austin and Dinan (2005); Anderson and Sallee (2011); Jacobsen (2013a)
3Goldberg (1998); Austin and Dinan (2005)
4Goldberg (1998); Kleit (2004); Fischer et al. (2007)
5Jacobsen (2011, 2013b)
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Several studies also look at how the CAFE standards impact other similar policies6
and directly compare the impact of these standards to gasoline taxes.7
In the EU, emissions pollutants are regulated instead of fuel economy. As
in the U.S. these regulations were first put into law in the 1970s, though they
were changed more often than the CAFE standards, most notably with changes in
1992-93, 1996, 2000, 2009, 2011, and 2014. More recent regulation in both Europe
and the U.S. that restricts the emission of carbon dioxide is synonymous with fuel
economy regulation, due to an inverse relationship between fuel economy and carbon
dioxide.
This paper examines the household travel demand response to changes in
fuel prices and fuel economy. Following Frondel and Vance (2013), this study uses
household-level travel diary data from the German Mobility Panel to answer two key
and related research questions. First, I test for an asymmetric response to prices.
Then, I explicitly test the equivalence of mileage elasticities with respect to fuel
economy and gas prices. If these elasticities differ, it is important to include both
fuel economy and fuel prices in the mileage equation to avoid biasing the estimate
through imposing coefficients of equal size, as well as to be able to report accurately
on the more effective environmental policy. If the coefficients are not equal and
opposite, then fuel economy policy and gas taxes will yield different results.
Both fuel economy (MPG) and the price of fuel (PF ) affect the cost per mile
(PM), given as PM =
PF
MPG
. If fuel economy improves, it becomes cheaper to drive.
6Bento et al. (2009); Goulder et al. (2012)
7Goldberg (1998); Austin and Dinan (2005); Anderson et al. (2011); Jacobsen (2013a)
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Therefore, if mileage is highly elastic with respect to fuel economy, then an improve-
ment in fuel economy will cause an increase in miles driven, a phenomenon known
as the rebound effect. While this change can increase the welfare of the individual
driver, the increase in mileage may mitigate much, or possibly all,8 of the reduc-
tion in emissions and oil consumption induced by the technological improvement.
Note also that these are not the only externalities associated with mileage; a high
elasticity would also mean increases in congestion and accidents.
Similarly, if the gas price elasticity of mileage is sufficiently low, then regula-
tions hoping to influence mileage through the price of gas, such as gasoline taxes,
may fail to reduce oil consumption or to help avert climate change. Drivers may
have inelastic demand for miles with respect to gas prices, especially in the US where
public transit options are slim and long distances must often be driven as part of a
daily commute to work.
Due to their relationship regarding the fuel cost per mile, the fuel economy
elasticity of mileage and the fuel price elasticity of mileage are assumed to be of equal
magnitude and opposite sign. Thus a study may use the response to gas prices to say
something about fuel economy regulation such as the CAFE standards, or combine
the two variables in a cost per mile to make use of the higher variation in gas prices
as compared to fuel economy; 9 however, this assumption is rarely tested, and in
cases when it is, it is often rejected.10
8Brookes (1990); Khazzoom (1980)
9Greene (1992); Jones (1993); Goldberg (1998); Small and Van Dender (2007); Frondel et al.
(2008); Barla et al. (2009); Gillingham (2014); Gillingham et al. (2015)
10Wheaton (1982); Small and Van Dender (2007); Linn (2013)
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The assumption is even less likely to hold when you consider that consumers
may respond differently to increasing prices than to decreasing prices. Although
there is some evidence of this asymmetric response to prices in a transportation
context, 11 little has been done to quantify and test the differences in elasticity.
Most studies use data from the US. These elasticities may be higher in Euro-
pean countries due to the higher quality of public transit and higher fuel prices. If
fuel prices rise, drivers may substitute miles driven for traveling by public transit
which has stickier prices. The high fuel prices mean that fuel costs are a larger
portion of overall travel costs, increasing the elasticity of mileage demand. Studies
which do use European data often find larger elasticities, especially in the mileage
elasticity with respect to fuel price;12 for example, Wheaton (1982) finds a fuel
economy elasticity of 0.06 and a fuel price elasticity of -0.50.
This paper extends the work of Frondel and Vance by making use of within-
year variation in the data to gain additional observations per household per year.
This allows me to quantify the consumer responses to gasoline prices and fuel econ-
omy with more longitudinal data than Frondel and Vance (2013) as well as to test
for asymmetric short term responses to price decreases, maximums, and recoveries.
13
By using each trip to the gas station as an observation, the number of observa-
tions available increases from 1100 to 12,180. With as many as 25 observations per
11Dargay (1992); Gately (1992); Dargay and Gately (1995, 1997); Gately and Huntington (2002);
Griffin and Schulman (2005)
12Wheaton (1982); Johansson and Schipper (1997); Frondel et al. (2008)
13Traill et al. (1978); Dargay (1992); Gately (1992); Dargay and Gately (1994, 1997); Gately
and Huntington (2002); Griffin and Schulman (2005)
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household per year, the effect of these price maxima can be estimated more precisely
than ever before. This is also the first paper to use the dummy variable method
first proposed by Tweeten and Quance (1969) to decompose prices into maxima,
recoveries, and decreases.
The estimated fuel economy elasticity of mileage is 0.533. This elasticity is
significantly different from the gas price elasticity of mileage during periods of de-
creasing gas prices, which is -0.048 in my preferred specification. Though there
was no evidence that consumers distinguished between historical maxima and other
price increases, there was a significant difference between the elasticity of gas prices
during periods of increasing prices, ranging from -0.262 to -0.289, and the elasticity
of gas prices during periods of decreasing prices. This indicates that an improve-
ment in fuel economy will increase miles driven by a large amount, while an increase
in the fuel tax will cause a decrease in mileage.
2.2 Background and Policy Context
The CAFE standards were first introduced in 1975 in response to the Arab Oil
Embargo, but after an initial increase in fuel economy, they remained unchanged
at 27.5 mpg for 20 years, from 1990 to 2010.14 Beginning in model year 2011, the
standards began to rise again. Recently, the lead agency, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has published estimated CAFE levels for
passenger cars that increase approximately 1.5 miles per gallon (mpg) each year
14National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2011)
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over the next 3 years, then increase by even larger margins, up to 2.4 mpg, for 2017
to 2025.15 This is the most rapid increase in stringency in the history of the CAFE
standards. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) projects that this
will cut 6 billion metric tons of greenhouse gases over the lifetimes of the vehicles
sold in model years 2012-2025, save families more than $1.7 trillion in fuel costs,
and reduce America’s dependence on oil by more than 2 million barrels per day in
2025.16
Although the CAFE standards remained unchanged from 1990 to 2010, the
U.S. did establish vehicle emissions standards in 1991 which were phased in from
2000 to 2004. These vehicle emissions standards were tightened with regulation
passed in 1999, effective 2004, in response to an average increase in miles driven of
3% per year from 1970 to 1997 and a growth in the sale of SUVs.17 In addition
to reducing the allowed grams of nitrous oxide per mile to 0.07, this was also the
first time that light-duty trucks, including SUVs, were held to the same standards
as passenger cars.
The EPA has also decreased the amount of sulfur allowed in gasoline, capping
total production as well as corporate average sulfur levels since 2004.18 Carbon
dioxide was not regulated until 2010 and those regulations are only just now going
into effect with model year 2016. Other emissions levels and sulfur levels in gasoline
are also facing tighter restrictions in model years 2017 to 2025 as of new regulations
15National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2012)
16U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2015c)
17U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999)
18U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999)
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passed in March 2014.
In the EU, emissions pollutants are regulated instead of fuel economy, with
different standards set for diesel engines versus gasoline engines. The regulation
covers nitrous oxide, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter. As
in the U.S. these regulations were first put into law in the 1970s, though they
were changed more often than the CAFE standards, most notably with changes
in 1992-93, 1996, 2000, 2009, 2011, and 2014. The levels of carbon monoxide,
hydrocarbons, and nitrous oxide allowed in 1992 were the same for both diesel and
gasoline engines, but after that a pattern emerged in which diesel engines were
allowed higher levels of nitrous oxide, but lower levels of carbon monoxide. Gasoline
engines did not face particulate matter restrictions until 2009.
The EU also introduced stricter sulfur regulation for fuel starting in 2000; the
maximum level decreased from 350 ppm in diesel engines and 150 ppm in gasoline
engines to 50 ppm in both in 2005. Sulfur-free (< 10 ppm) fuels became mandatory
in 2009.19 Carbon dioxide was addressed through voluntary agreements in 1998, and
initially there were large reductions in this pollutant, but when emissions reductions
stagnated in 2004, a mandatory program was created. Regulation adopted in 2009
set a goal of 130 g/km to be reached by 2015, while regulation passed in 2014 set a
target of 95 g/km to be reached by 2021.20
There is an extensive literature estimating mileage elasticities with respect to




estimation technique have led to a wide range of estimates; a few examples may be
seen in Table 2.1 . These estimates range from -0.045 to -0.69, though there is some
consensus just above -0.20.
Table 2.1: Mileage Elasticity Literature
Study Type of elasticity Estimated Value
Gately (1990) U.S. fuel cost per mile elasticity 1966-1988 -0.07 to -0.09
Greene (1992) U.S. fuel cost per mile elasticity 1966-1989 -0.05 to -0.15
Schimek (1996) U.S. fuel economy elasticity and fuel price elasticity Short-run: -0.05 to -0.07;
Long-run: -0.21 to -0.29
Greene et al. (1999) U.S. fuel cost per mile elasticity 1979-1994 -0.23
Puller and Greening (1999) U.S. fuel price elasticity 1980-1990 -0.69
Small and van Dender (2007) U.S. fuel cost per mile elasticity 1966-2001 Short-run: -0.045;
Long-run: -0.222
Barla et al. (2009) Canada fuel cost per mile elasticity 1990-2004 Short-run: -0.08;
Long-run: -0.16 to -0.18
Gillingham (2014) California fuel price elasticity -0.22
Gillingham et al. (2015) Pennsylvania fuel price elasticity 2000-2010 -0.10
Note: This is only a small sample of such mileage elasticity estimates
In its purest form, the rebound effect is the elasticity of fuel demand with re-
spect to fuel economy. By making several assumptions, a variety of other definitions
are often used instead, including the own price elasticity of fuel demand, the own
price elasticity of mileage demand, the elasticity of mileage demand with respect to
fuel economy, and the fuel price elasticity of mileage demand.
These elasticities have importance beyond their potential equivalence to the
rebound effect. For example, the fuel price elasticity of mileage gives insight into the
effect that a gas tax increase has on miles driven, which in turn provides insight into
the effect that such a policy would have on other externalities such as congestion and
accidents. Similarly, the elasticity of mileage demand with respect to fuel economy
can reveal how fuel efficiency regulation such as the CAFE standards impact these
12
same externalities, without compromising the insight into fuel demand.
Because of the relationship between miles driven, fuel efficiency, and fuel con-
sumption, Miles = fuel efficiency × liters of fuel, the elasticity of fuel demand
with respect to fuel economy is equal to the elasticity of mileage demand with re-
spect to fuel economy minus one. As a result, the rebound effect literature includes
many of the same elasticities that this study explores here, but this work provides
insight into several economic policies and issues, with the rebound effect as only a
small part of this.
2.3 Methodology
Regulation such as the CAFE standards, which are designed to improve the
fuel economy of new vehicles available for sale, is put in place to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and to reduce the consumption of gasoline; however, if the reduction
in cost per mile induces an increase in miles driven, then these types of regulation
may not create the desired decrease in pollution. This requires an estimation of
Equation 2.1, based on a double log demand function for miles as a function of price
per mile.
ln(Milesit) = α + αPF ln(pit) + αMPGln(MPGit) + αxxit + ξi + νit (2.1)
Many datasets do not contain fuel economy data, and when they do there
is often measurement error or limited variation in the efficiency variable, making
it unsuitable for use in empirical work. The measurement error often results from
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obtaining fuel economy based on the make, model, and model year of the vehicle
when more specific trim level information is unavailable, though it can also be a
result of inaccurate self-reporting by drivers. If efficiency data is unavailable or
likely measured in error, then energy prices may be used instead. Because of the
relationship between fuel economy (MPG) and fuel prices (PF ) in the calculation of
fuel cost per mile (PM), PM =
PF
MPG
, these variables are expected to have an equal
and opposite effect on mileage.
Because fuel economy and emission regulations are concerned with improve-
ments in fuel economy, the appropriate counterpart of an improvement in fuel econ-
omy would be a decrease in gas prices, since a decrease in fuel prices has an equivalent
effect on cost per mile as an improvement in fuel economy. If the consumer response
to an increase in gas prices is equal and opposite to a decrease in gas prices, price
data may be included in a symmetric model like that found in Equation 2.1. As
discussed above, however, households may not respond symmetrically to fuel price
increases and decreases. If so, price increases should be separated from price de-
creases. Because the elasticity of mileage demand may be larger in periods of rising
energy prices, if a symmetric model is assumed instead of allowing for the possibility
of asymmetry, the rebound effect may be overestimated.
Following Frondel and Vance (2013) this paper uses the price decomposition
first put forth by Tweeten and Quance (1969). In their 1969 paper, Tweeten and
Quance create dummy variables for periods of increasing and decreasing prices, then
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multiply said variables by the price level, as below.
p−it = pit if pit < pi(t−1); 0 otherwise
p+it = pit if pit ≥ pi(t−1); 0 otherwise
This results in two variables with values that are positive or equal to zero and
that sum up to the current price level. Wolffram (1971) criticized this method for
implying a discontinuity in the demand curve, and suggested the use of a cumulative
price change decomposition, adding price increases to the initial price to create a
price increase variable and subtracting price decreases from the initial price to create
a price decrease variable.
The literature on asymmetry has since built on this cumulative decomposition,
with a notable extension coming from Traill et al. (1978), who allow for a distinction
between historical price maxima and price increases below the maximum, referred
to as price recoveries. They argue that drivers are not asymmetric in their response
to price decreases and price recoveries, only to price maxima.
Any of the models that are based on Wolffram (1971) have the unexpected
result of indicating that higher price volatility leads to higher output, as detailed by
Griffin and Schulman (2005, p. 7). By including an additional constant term for the
case of price increases, the price asymmetry causes a change in either the intercept or
the slope of the regression equation, thus correcting for the initial criticism offered
by Wolffram (1971). Modifying Equation 2.1 based on this approach yields the
regression equation used in this paper, found in Equation 2.2.
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are defined similarly, xit is a matrix of control variables discussed below and ξi are
household fixed effects. Due to complications arising from intervehicle substitution
in multivehicle households, this paper restricts the sample to single-vehicle house-
holds; thus i represents both household and vehicle. This regression equation allows
for the testing of four null hypotheses as follows.
H0 : αprec = αp− (2.3a)
H0 : αpmax = αp− (2.3b)
H0 : αpmax = αprec (2.3c)
There are a variety of explanations for the source of the price asymmetry in a
transportation context. One is asset fixity. Long periods of high or increasing prices
may induce an industry-wide technological change which is irreversible. Another
explanation for price asymmetry is the different information regarding price changes.
Falling prices rarely make headlines, while major price increases can be sensational.
Dargay and Gately (1997, p. 72) propose that the concept of addiction asymmetry,
or the “tendency to acquire habits to consume more easily than to abandon them,”
may be driving the asymmetric response. In other words, if a driver alters his or
her behavior to consume less fuel in response to increasing gasoline prices, he or she
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is unlikely to revert to the earlier driving behavior when prices fall.
Habit formation theory suggests that utility is based on both current and past
consumption, thus pushing rational consumers to consider future prices when mak-
ing current consumption decisions. Because of this non-separability of preferences
over time, an increase in consumption in the current period leads to further in-
creases in the future. Although this theory does not directly imply asymmetry, it
does show that influences beyond current prices impact consumer decisions, and it
creates inertia that may be difficult to reverse. For example, Scott (2012) finds that
consumers respond more strongly to fuel tax increases, viewed as permanent changes
in gasoline prices, than to market fluctuations, viewed as temporary changes. It is
possible that consumers during the sample period used in this work perceive price
increases as more likely to recur, while price decreases may be viewed as more tem-
porary. This seems plausible given the overall trend of increasing real gasoline prices
evident in Figure 2.1. If this does represent German consumer expectations, then
the asymmetry may be explained by habit formation theory.
It should be noted that other factors, such as transaction costs, can appear
in the data to be similar to habit formation. Because of the time and financial
costs involved in purchasing a new vehicle, increases in gasoline prices may induce a
household to purchase a more fuel efficient vehicle, while a decrease in gasoline prices
is unlikely to cause the household to return to the previous level of fuel economy,
given the durable nature of automobiles. The rapid depreciation of automobiles
creates additional disincentives to dispose of and purchase new vehicles frequently.
Because the vehicle fleet is held constant in this study, these issues of transaction
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costs and durable decisions do not play a role in the results.
Figure 2.1: Real Gasoline Price in Germany
All of these theories indicate that the response to price increases may be larger
than the response to decreases, which, if true, would lead to a biased estimate
of the fuel price elasticity of mileage based on an assumption of a symmetrical
response. For example, if a gas price elasticity of mileage were obtained using data
from a period of overall rising gas prices but the author assumed symmetry, then
the estimate would overestimate the elasticity that would be found in a period of
declining prices. Because price falls have the same impact on the cost per mile as the
improvements in fuel economy caused by regulation such as the CAFE standards,
it is the response to gasoline price decreases that could estimate the relevant fuel
economy elasticity of mileage, should these elasticities be equivalent.
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Hypotheses 2.3a through 2.3c provide a basis for the test of price asymmetry.
If these restrictions are correct, prices need not be decomposed into periods of
increasing and decreasing prices in order to get unbiased estimates of fuel price
elasticities of mileage. If these hypotheses are rejected, however, then αp− is the
appropriate proxy for a fuel economy elasticity in a discussion of regulation intended
to improve fuel economy or decrease emissions; if so, papers which do not use this
decomposition will present upwardly biased estimates.
Because this paper holds vehicle stock constant, evidence of asymmetry will
not be the result of technological change or asset fixity, two common explanations
for the presence of asymmetry. Instead, the rejection of any of Hypotheses 2.3a
through 2.3c will speak to either a difference in information regarding fuel price
changes, to a more psychological phenomenon of addiction asymmetry, the tendency
for individuals to hold onto their established habits unless pushed strongly to change,
or to the economic theory of habit formation which states that consumers respond
more strongly to price changes perceived as permanent due to their expected impact
on future utility.
This paper tests for a difference in response to historical price maxima versus
price increases below these historical maxima in addition to the gas price elasticity of
price decreases calculated by Frondel and Vance (2013). Traill et al. (1978) assume
that price rises above historical maxima have asymmetric effects while price rises
below maxima do not. Their argument, however, focuses on asset fixity and changes
in the vehicle stock.
Although this study does not deal with vehicle purchases by restricting the
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sample to households which do not change their vehicle fleet, the concept of addiction
asymmetry supports the importance of looking separately at price maxima. It is
possible that while increases in price cause changes in driving behavior, decreases
are not large enough to push drivers to alter their habits. While I believe that
subsequent price increases below the price maximum may alter driving behavior,
making price recoveries more relevant than in the case of asset change, I do think
that price maxima may create larger responses.
Griffin and Schulman (2005) propose instead that households may respond
more strongly to price maxima because they cannot easily change the vehicle stock,
thus preventing them from disinvesting in efficiency improvements. In papers that
look at long-run situations, Griffin and Schulman (2005, pg. 2) argue that price
asymmetry acts as a proxy for technical change rather than representing true asym-
metry unless technical change is explicitly controlled for. Because my sample is
restricted to households which do not change their vehicle fleet, any evidence of
asymmetry is not the result of omitting technical change; instead the results of this
paper will capture asymmetry resulting from changes in driving behavior.
H0 : αMPG = −αp− (2.1)
Hypothesis 2.1 allows for the testing of the equivalence of the fuel price elas-
ticity of mileage and the fuel economy elasticity of mileage. Note that the two
coefficients are expected to have opposite signs. If Hypothesis 2.1 cannot be re-
jected, then using price elasticities will provide unbiased estimates in studies on
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regulation regarding the CAFE standards and emissions standards. Recall that
all of the theories discussed above—habit formation theory, addiction asymmetry,
and media attention regarding price increases—suggest that households respond less
strongly to decreasing fuel prices than to increasing prices; therefore, using a sym-
metric price model that does not decompose prices will estimate a price elasticity
that is above the decreasing price elasticity and below the increasing price elasticity.
Hence, if Hypothesis 2.1 is false, then studies using price data to add variation will
likely estimate the consumer response to fuel economy with bias.
2.4 Data
This paper uses the German Mobility Panel, a rotating panel travel survey
that follows the same household for up to three consecutive years, and covers the
years 1997 through 2009. The dataset consists of two parts, one a trip diary that
takes place every fall, and the other a refueling-based survey in which the household
records fuel purchase decisions for up to two months the following spring. The latter
requires making note of the total cost of fuel per each stop at a gas station to refuel,
the quantity of fuel purchased, and the kilometers driven since the last refueling.
Additionally, the dataset includes household information, individual-specific char-
acteristics, and transportation-relevant data such as make, model, and model year
of the vehicle, horsepower, engine size, fuel type, and the distance to public transit
options.
The dependent variable, in my model daily kilometers driven, and the key
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independent variables, fuel price in Euros per liter and observed fuel economy in
kilometers per liter, are computed from these refueling records. Additional con-
trols include the number of children in the household, the number of part-time and
full-time employed household members, real monthly household income in Euros,
population density in hundreds of residents per km2, the number of household mem-
bers who changed jobs in the last year, vehicle age, the total number of household
members, a dummy variable indicating that the vehicle was used for the purpose
of taking a vacation during the survey period, 21 and the number of household
members with an “Abitur”, an advanced high school diploma.
The scope of this study is restricted to single-vehicle households to prevent
the complications of vehicle substitution in multicar households. This study uses
each refueling as an observation, in sharp contrast with Frondel and Vance (2013),
who use one observation per household per year.
Observed fuel economy is of course influenced by the manufacturer-specified,
on-paper fuel economy of the vehicle, but is likely to vary with vehicle maintenance
and driver behavior.22 The EPA itself acknowledges that the purpose of the posted
fuel economy is to allow car buyers to more easily compare the efficiency across sev-
eral vehicles when shopping for a new vehicle. These numbers cannot account for
changes in driving conditions that drivers face, including weather and road condi-
tions. Different drivers also have different driving styles that will affect their actual
21Frondel and Vance (2013, p. 49) argue that “undertaking a vacation trip with the car crucially
depends on factors other than current fuel prices, such as preferences for the vacation destination
and the cost of alternative modes,” so this variable is assumed to be exogenous.
22U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2014a)
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fuel economy, and over time a driver may have different on-road experiences that
affect this driving style. In this study, the focus is on these behavioral changes in
driving style as vehicle fleet is held constant, leaving driving behavior the only source
of variation in fuel economy. Using a unique dataset capturing detailed driving data
including speed, acceleration, and fuel consumption at ten second intervals, Langer
and McRae (2015) document the high level of variation in fuel economy of different
drivers with identical vehicles. They also show that within a single trip by a driver,
fuel economy varies tremendously.
Due both to its short nature and to the lack of data on vehicle purchase deci-
sions, the German Mobility Panel is not well suited to studying long-run responses
to fuel price changes such as purchasing new vehicles or relocating closer to the place
of work. This paper focuses on short-run responses and elasticities. Such short-run
responses may include driving more slowly, accelerating more gradually, taking fewer
unnecessary trips, or combining several trips into one trip. These behavioral changes
can be easy to make and are more likely to occur during the days and weeks follow-
ing a price change, as compared to the long-run responses described above which
would likely take place after several months of increasing prices. Annual averages
would be unlikely to capture everyday behavioral responses as accurately as shorter
time periods.
Theoretically, people should drive fewer miles or they should drive more effi-
ciently by altering driving speed and acceleration after price increases. Dargay and
Gately (1997) show that households will not revert to driving more miles or to driv-
ing less efficiently after a price decrease. This may be because this would involve
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giving up newfound savings and convenience; if a behavioral change induced by
the price increase included combining errands into one trip and therefore reducing
mileage over running each errand separately, this would give the driver more leisure
time, as less time will be wasted with unnecessarily repetitive mileage. Addiction
asymmetry theory indicates that individuals are resistant to change, as though al-
tering behavior comes with a transaction cost; although price increases may push
them beyond this resistance and institute a change in behavior, the habit becomes
set, and price decreases do not provide enough incentive to overcome the aversion
to altering behavior. Therefore, there should be little change in behavior following
price decreases, while a price increase should cause a decrease in miles driven and/or
an increase in fuel economy.
As an example, if prices on average fall over the course of the year, a yearly
observation would then suggest that driving behavior should not change; however,
that annual average belies the potential for several price increases to have taken
place over the course of the year. Addiction asymmetry theory thus suggests that
there could have been a change in behavior following each increase, with subsequent
decreases having little reverse effect. Yearly observations cannot capture the large
variation in gasoline prices that take place over the course of the year; using ob-
servations taken daily allows me to observe more of the variation and to take the
frequency of price increases or decreases into consideration rather than just the aver-
age size and direction of the change over the past year. When such short-run effects
are the subject under investigation, therefore, it is important to use observations
over as short a period as possible.
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In this particular case of the German Mobility Panel, which follows households
for up to three consecutive years, the calculation of price changes necessary for
evaluation of asymmetry reduces the number of observations per household to a
maximum of two. This makes for a very short panel, and does not allow for the
inclusion for a price maximum variable in the work of Frondel and Vance (2013).
By using each trip to the gas station as an observation, the observations available
increases from 1100 to 12,180. There are a total of 1,552 households, with an average
of 200 households in any given wave. This also allows me to test for the possibility
of a higher consumer response to historical price maxima.
Summary statistics based on this sample are presented in Table 2.2. Sample
means and standard deviations weighted based on the number of days between re-
fuelings are included for comparison in Table 2.3. The weighted summary statistics
should be representative of the average household in the population, whereas the
unweighted summary statistics are representative of the average refueling and thus
skewed towards households which drive more and therefore refuel more. More de-
tailed statistics are given on the variation in fuel prices and fuel economy in Table
2.4. There is more variation within households than between households in the fuel
economy variable, but there is ample variation of both types. Most of the variation
in fuel prices, however, comes from between household variation.
In cases where multiple refuelings were made on the same day, these observa-
tions were aggregated into one observation. Liters of fuel purchased and kilometers
23The median number of days between refuelings was 8; the mean was slightly higher at 10.30
due to a small number of outliers at the high end of the spectrum. While these households certainly
seemed unusual, it was not clear that these outliers were the result of measurement error, so they
were included in the regression sample.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics N=12,180
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
daily km23 75.52 99.38 0.25 1368.00
price max (AC) 1.06 0.16 0.52 2.03
price recovery (AC) 1.00 0.16 0.48 1.39
price drop (AC) 0.99 0.16 0.05 1.37
fuel economy (km/L) 13.10 5.64 0.06 55.61
number of children 0.44 0.83 0.00 4.00
net real monthly income (thousands of AC) 2.08 0.66 0.22 3.86
number of employed household members 0.92 0.79 0.00 4.00
job change (dummy) 0.14 0.39 0.00 4.00
car vacation (dummy) 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
population density (residents per km2) 0.87 1.02 0.04 4.27
car age (years) 6.41 4.31 0.00 35.00
household size 2.30 1.15 1.00 7.00
education 0.59 0.74 0.00 5.00
average rainfall since last refueling (mm) 20.38 21.18 0.00 300.67
average snow depth since last refueling (mm) 0.01 0.33 0.00 30.00
average high temperature since last refueling (degrees Celsius) 19.54 5.49 -0.07 34.60
average low temperature since last refueling (degrees Celsius) 8.99 3.19 -2.40 18.97
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics Weighting Based on Days Between Refuelings
Mean Std. Dev.
daily km 41.45 44.22
price max (AC) 1.06 0.15
price recovery (AC) 1.00 0.16
price drop (AC) 0.98 0.16
fuel economy (km/L) 13.33 5.53
number of children 0.42 0.81
net real monthly income (thousands of AC) 2.06 0.65
number of employed household members 0.85 0.79
job change (dummy) 0.12 0.37
car vacation (dummy) 0.23 0.42
population density (residents per km2) 0.89 1.03
car age (years) 6.47 4.34
household size 2.25 1.12
education 0.57 0.73
average rainfall since last refueling (mm) 21.11 16.86
average snow depth since last refueling (mm) 0.01 0.21
average high temperature since last refueling (degrees Celsius) 20.38 3.48
average low temperature since last refueling (degrees Celsius) 9.32 2.62
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Table 2.4: Panel Summary Statistics for Fuel Economy and Fuel Prices
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
fuel economy (km/L) overall 13.10 5.639175 0.063291 55.61224
between 3.205011 1.031746 34.15054
within 4.889142 -8.0248 57.57192
price max (AC) overall 1.06 0.155642 0.522413 2.027411
between 0.152074 0.524974 1.605716
within 0.05164 0.565798 1.56015
price recovery (AC) overall 1.00 0.163447 0.483193 1.387828
between 0.156271 0.516593 1.331169
within 0.048289 0.513836 1.310115
price drop (AC) overall 0.99 0.161551 0.054604 1.371178
between 0.151496 0.511668 1.325758
within 0.062598 0.061561 1.428838
driven are the summation of the multiple fillups, and the price is the average price
of the multiple fillups. These observations constitute a small portion of the overall
sample, less than 3%.
In cases where households did not completely fill the tank, fuel economy was
created as the average fuel economy between complete tank fillups. Observations in
which fuel economy is higher than 56 km per liter are dropped, although the results
presented below are robust to the inclusion of observations with outlier values. This




The data described above are applied to Equation 2.2 and yield the results
shown in Table 2.5.
Some might argue that endogeneity could be biasing these results because
expected demand for miles may influence the choice of fuel economy in a new vehicle,
but these should be captured in the fixed effect. 24 If an individual expects to drive
long distances, he or she may purchase a high-efficiency vehicle to reduce costs, or
he or she may buy a large vehicle that is more comfortable than a small vehicle
but also likely less efficient. Drivers with pro-environmental beliefs are more likely
to buy fuel efficient vehicles as well as making an effort to limit mileage. Living in
an urban environment can decrease necessary mileage through the close proximity
of work and errand destinations as well as increased access to alternative forms
of transportation. At the same time, people in cities may buy more fuel efficient
vehicles if they opt for alternative fuel vehicles which operate better in the city
than on the highway, or the decreased expected mileage may cause city-dwellers to
purchase less fuel efficient vehicles. These factors are time-invariant in the short-run
and, as the model used in this paper holds vehicle fleet constant, are therefore not
present in the fixed effect model. As a result, this is the model this paper will focus
on.25
The fixed effect results show fuel price elasticity estimates ranging from -0.048
24As a robustness check, the model was run excluding fuel economy. See Table A.1 in Appendix
A for the price elasticity estimates.
25Results are also highly robust to time fixed effects. See Table A.2 in Appendix A
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for price decreases to -0.289 for price recoveries. These estimates are lower than the
results found by Frondel and Vance (2013) and are in line with the literature, only
slightly higher than the -0.22 to -0.23 estimates supported by several studies. 26
Although the price decrease estimate is statistically insignificant, the small size of
both the estimated coefficient and the standard error rules out a large elasticity. It
is reasonable to assume that this is a precisely estimated zero, and consumers show
a completely inelastic response to fuel prices during periods of decreasing prices,
because the standard error on the fixed effect specification estimate of the price
drop variable is quite low, indicating that the lack of significance may come more
from the diminutive size of the coefficient.
As seen in the hypothesis test results displayed at the bottom of Table 2.5,
there is not evidence of a statistically different response to price maxima versus price
increases below historical maxima in any specification. This indicates that it may be
sufficient to decompose prices into price increases and price decreases, rather than
separating price increases into recoveries and maxima. There is ample evidence of
asymmetry, however; the coefficients on price decreases are significantly different
from both types of price increases in all specifications. The mileage elasticity with
respect to decreasing fuel prices is around 0.20 lower than the mileage elasticity with
respect to increasing fuel prices in the OLS and fixed effect specifications. Therefore,
studies using a symmetric price model will show biased estimates. Although drivers
have an inelastic response to price decreases, an increase in the price of fuel, such
26Haughton and Sarkar (1996); Greene et al. (1999); Small and Van Dender (2007); Gillingham
(2014)
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Table 2.5: Asymmetric Results
Dependent Variable: ln(Daily KM driven)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
price max -0.357*** -0.262**
(0.099) (0.104)
price rec -0.365*** -0.289***
(0.114) (0.104)
price drop -0.212*** -0.048
(0.082) (0.077)
ln(fuel economy) 0.542*** 0.533***
(0.025) (0.027)




# employed 0.089*** -0.013
(0.019) (0.031)
job change 0.054* 0.034
(0.031) (0.038)
car vacation 0.307*** 0.272***
(0.024) (0.029)
population density -0.023 0.151*
(0.014) (0.078)
car age -0.013*** -0.009
(0.003) (0.005)








temp min 0.048*** 0.054***
(0.005) (0.004)
temp max -0.078*** -0.077***
(0.003) (0.003)
p rec 0.061*** -0.005
(0.016) (0.015)




Adj. R-squared 0.282 0.258
H0 : αprice rec = αprice drop p=0.0873 0.0044
H0 : αprice max = αprice drop p=0.1473 0.0158
H0 : αprice max = αprice rec p=0.9500 0.8052
H0 : αMPG = −αprice drop p=0.0002 0.0000
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations: 12,108. Number of Households: 1,552
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as would be caused by a fuel tax increase, would reduce miles driven.
Based on the theory of habit formation, the relatively inelastic consumer re-
sponse to decreasing prices may be resulting from expectations that the price de-
creases are temporary. As seen in Figure 2.1, for the first six years of my sample,
gas prices remained fairly stable in Germany, but in the second half of the sample
prices were on an overall upward trend, with the exception of a sizeable price fall in
late 2008. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to think that consumers would expect
gasoline prices to increase, or at least for increasing prices to be more persistent
than decreasing prices. If price increases are expected to be permanent, while de-
creases are considered temporary, consumers would show a larger change in behavior
following a price increase.27
The lack of asymmetry between price maxima and price recoveries may be an
indication that consumers do not pay any additional attention to price maxima than
they do to any other price increase, but it may also be resulting from the restriction
of vehicle stock. My sample includes only households that do not alter their vehicle
stock, but when Traill et al. (1978) initially included a price maximum variable it
was with the argument revolving around purchasing new factors of production, in
this case an automobile. It would be interesting to see if Hypothesis 2.3c still fails
to be rejected in a study that can account for changes in the vehicle stock, as it
seems possible that this distinction between different types of price increases may




The fuel economy elasticity of mileage is robust across specifications, hovering
around 0.535. This is significantly higher than the fuel price elasticity of mileage
during periods of decreasing prices. Therefore, if a study’s sample period includes
decreases in fuel prices, the fuel price elasticity of mileage demand will underestimate
the effect of fuel economy policy such as the CAFE standards. The estimate is closer
to the fuel price elasticity of mileage during periods of increasing prices, although
the difference is significant at the 5% level in the fixed effect specification.
Because the vehicle fleet is held constant, the variation in fuel economy in this
paper comes from different sources than that present in most papers modeling fuel
economy through vehicle choice. Rather than fuel economy changing as households
purchase new vehicles, fuel economy varies with driver behavior and environmental
factors such as road conditions. Although these sources of variation are free from the
endogeneity problem associated with vehicle choice being associated with expected
miles driven, they are also potentially endogenous. Some of these sources of fuel
economy variation, such as weather conditions, may be controlled for through inclu-
sion in the regression equation. Others can be controlled for through the inclusion
of fixed effects, such as a driver’s innate driving style. Others are harder to control
for, such as current road conditions, route attributes, and vehicle maintenance. 28
Traffic conditions may influence fuel economy in that idling or travelling at very
low speeds both decrease fuel economy. Drivers may also choose to drive less during
28The only data available on vehicle maintenance in the German Mobility Panel is whether or
not the vehicle was in the shop during the survey period. It does not specify if this is the result
of vehicle damage or if it is for routine maintenance, and there are very few observations in which
any type of maintenance occurs, less than 3%. Inclusion of this variables has almost no effect on
the results.
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periods of dense traffic to save time; on the other hand, rush hour traffic is slow
precisely because most drivers must travel to and from their places of work at certain
times of day, in which case drivers may be more likely to drive during periods of dense
traffic. To the extent that a household’s commute is time-invariant, this issue will
be controlled for through the inclusion of fixed effects. The commute is most likely
to change following a change in job, which is explicitly included in the regression.
As a result, changes in traffic conditions over time are expected to have minimal
endogeneity bias in this regression. There is still the matter of changes in the
make-up of the miles driven on a given refueling. If a consumer puts more commuting
miles between fillups, there will be lower fuel economy, assuming commuting takes
place during rush hour with heavier traffic. This decrease in fuel economy will induce
a smaller number of miles driven between these fillups. Therefore, commuting may
create correlation between the fuel economy and miles driven, resulting in an upward
bias.
Route attributes such as the number of stop signs on a trip may have similar
effects on fuel economy, but are less likely to affect the mileage decision directly.
There may still be correlation between route attributes and miles traveled, however,
in that higher fuel economy is achieved on highways than in urban environments
and drivers typically use highways to travel longer distances than urban roads.
The population density of the area helps to control for this, but to the extent
that endogeneity bias remains this will cause an upward bias in the fuel economy
coefficient.
Vehicle maintenance is required more frequently when more miles are driven,
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and some types of maintenance improve fuel economy. Similarly, if there is a problem
with the vehicle, the fuel economy may be decreased, and the driver may be less
inclined to drive the vehicle. This is therefore another potential source of upwardly
biasing endogeneity, indicating that the estimated fuel economy elasticity may be
an upper bound.
To instrument for these sources of endogeneity, this study would require a
variable that affects the observed fuel economy of the vehicle but which does not im-
pact miles driven directly. Such an instrument is almost impossible to find as most
sources of fuel economy variation are endogenous; as just discussed both mainte-
nance problems with the vehicle and the type of road on which the vehicle is driven
impact both fuel economy and mileage. Weather, too, could affect both fuel economy
and mileage, largely through precipitation but also through extreme temperatures.
Drivers may be less likely to take extraneous trips in extreme weather. Precipita-
tion could also cause drivers to drive more defensively, potentially increasing fuel
economy, as well as decreasing the grip of the tire treads on roadways, decreasing
fuel economy. Cold temperatures also decrease fuel economy.29
Although fuel prices are usually assumed to be exogenous, the actual prices
paid by drivers may be endogenous. This paper assumes them to be exogenous,
but a robustness check is run using state average fuel prices found in the German
Mobility Panel to instrument for local fuel prices. Although the point estimates for
price elasticities do not change much, the standard errors increase enough to remove
significance. Fuel economy results are unchanged. These results can be found in
29U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014)
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Table A.3. 30
There is some concern about the endogenous sampling that occurs when each
refueling is used as an observation; households which drive more miles will need to
refuel more often and will therefore appear more often in the dataset. If the model
is well-specified, the expectation of the coefficient should be the same regardless of
weight used to correct for this problem. One can argue about the correct way to
weight, but weighting based on the estimated number of times a household would
refuel, the total number of liters purchased by a household, and leaving the sample
unweighted yields essentially the same results; the results of the key hypothesis tests
are unchanged and the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are similar. Under
the argument for doing estimation at the level for which data is available, this paper
focuses on the unweighted results. The results from the weighted models appear in
Appendix A in Tables A.4 and A.5.
It would be interesting to explore the possibility that households respond dif-
ferently to large fuel price changes or persistent price changes. This would require a
larger dataset, however; in the German Mobility Panel, by far the vast majority of
price changes that took place during this period were small price changes of short
duration. This is not surprising given the volatility in fuel prices, and a very large
number of observations would be required to have enough long-trending or large
price changes to have any power in estimating these effects.
Results using a symmetric model are included for comparison in Table 2.6.
30National level oil prices are also used to instrument, but make for bad instruments. These
results are also included in Table A.3.
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The coefficient on fuel price is much closer to the price increase coefficients from
the asymmetric results than to the price decrease coefficient. The fuel economy
estimate remains unchanged around 0.46. Although the symmetric price coefficient
is higher than the price decrease coefficient in the asymmetric model, the fixed effect
results still show a statistically significant difference in the price elasticity and the
fuel economy elasticity of mileage demand. Table 2.6 also shows results using a fuel
cost per mile variable, fuel price divided by the fuel economy. The fuel cost per mile
coefficients are very close to the negative of the fuel economy coefficients, indicating
that the fuel cost variable in this sample is identified primarily by the variation in
fuel economy rather than fuel price variation.
These results indicate that estimating the effect of a price increase, such as a
gas tax increase, using a symmetric model would slightly underestimate the effect
of the price increase. Using the symmetric model price results to discuss regulation
which improves fuel economy, such as the CAFE standards or emissions standards,
would result in an underestimation of the effect of this regulation. This assumes
that the fuel economy estimate is not available, thus necessitating the use of the
price elasticity as a proxy, or that there is insufficient variation in the fuel economy
data available, such that fuel prices are combined with fuel economy in a price per
mile. When the fuel economy variable is excluded, the fixed effect estimate drops
0.09, though still remains well above the asymmetric estimate at 0.179.
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Table 2.6: Symmetric Results
Dependent Variable: ln(Daily KM driven)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
price -0.367*** -0.269***
(0.075) (0.087)
ln(fuel economy) 0.528*** 0.521***
(0.025) (0.027)
ln(fuel cost per mile) -0.507*** -0.513***
(0.024) (0.027)
# children -0.021 0.033 -0.022 0.031
(0.022) (0.057) (0.022) (0.058)
income 0.061** 0.035 0.054** 0.033
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
# employed 0.092*** -0.014 0.093*** -0.013
(0.019) (0.031) (0.019) (0.031)
job change 0.057* 0.036 0.059* 0.033
(0.031) (0.039) (0.031) (0.039)
car vacation 0.314*** 0.275*** 0.314*** 0.278***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029)
population density -0.024* 0.150** -0.025* 0.164**
(0.014) (0.075) (0.014) (0.066)
car age -0.012*** -0.008 -0.012*** -0.007
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
hh size -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011
(0.021) (0.043) (0.021) (0.043)
education 0.069*** 0.016 0.073*** 0.018
(0.019) (0.037) (0.019) (0.037)
rain -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
snow -0.016 -0.011 -0.015 -0.010
(0.027) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023)
temp min 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.057***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
temp max -0.080*** -0.078*** -0.080*** -0.078***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 3.522*** 3.468*** 3.577*** 3.477***
(0.094) (0.140) (0.092) (0.136)
Adj. R-squared 0.274 0.254 0.273 0.253
H0 : αMPG = −αprice p=0.0419 0.0043
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations: 12,180. Number of Households: 1,552
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2.6 Conclusions
This model shows that there is asymmetry in the consumer response to prices,
and when it is allowed for, consumers show a much lower response to price decreases
than price increases. The paper also finds that households do not respond to price
decreases in an equal and opposite way as they do to improvements in fuel economy;
instead households seem to respond to improvements in fuel economy at the same
magnitude at which they respond to price increases. The magnitudes of these elas-
ticities imply that fuel economy policy is less effective at influencing mileage and oil
consumption than increases in the gas tax.
When fuel prices go up, households decrease their miles driven by one quarter
to one half the size of the change in fuel prices. An increase in the gas tax would
therefore result in a decrease in miles driven that is smaller than the required amount
to maintain the same expenditure on transportation. Although drivers will decrease
miles, there is a degree of inelasticity such that they will pay more to continue to
drive considerable distances.
Based on the fuel economy elasticity of mileage estimated in this paper, an
improvement in fuel economy resulting from strengthening the CAFE standards or
emissions standards common in Europe will increase miles driven by just under half
the size of the change in fuel economy. If the fuel economy variable used here is
endogenous however, then researchers can use the negative of the response to a
decrease in fuel prices, which is significantly lower, to provide insight into responses
to changes in fuel economy.
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Carbon dioxide emissions are linearly related to fuel consumption, the inverse
of fuel economy.31 The EU recently passed regulations limiting CO2 emissions from
vehicles to 95 g/km by 2021, down from the target of 130 g/km in 2015,32 a 27%
change. The fuel tax in Germany is currently AC0.6545, while Tscharaktschiew (2014)
finds that the optimal tax is AC0.96, a 47% increase. My model predicts that a 27%
improvement in fuel economy, equivalent to the 27% decrease in emissions currently
regulated, will result in a 12.7% to 13.0% increase in miles driven. Similarly, if the
proposed tax change were implemented, there would be an 11.3% to 23.7% decrease
in miles driven.
This suggests that the true change in mileage resulting from the above policy
changes would be twice as high as the literature would predict based on a 0.22
elasticity. The model predicts a smaller change in mileage than Frondel and Vance
(2013) predict, as low as two-thirds the size in the case of the emissions regulation
and one-third the size in the case of the tax increase.
If the goal of these policies is to decrease oil consumption or miles driven,
then fuel economy or emissions regulation may be inferior to gasoline taxes as the
increase in mileage following an improvement in fuel economy is of a considerable
size, while the decrease in mileage following an increase in fuel prices is at least as
high, if not higher, than the overall consensus in the literature. If endogeneity is
expected to be biasing the fuel economy estimate, however, then the price decrease
variable is a better estimate of the impact of these policies, in which case the increase
31U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2015b)
32Mock (2014)
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in mileage following an improvement in fuel economy is much smaller, and may in
fact be zero. In this case, although the gas tax would yield a decrease in miles
driven, fuel economy or emissions policy may be an acceptable alternative if there
is insurmountable political difficulty associated with a tax increase.
This model shows that there may be more to adjustments in fuel economy
than just a desire to influence cost per mile. This may be the result of external
forces such as weather and road conditions, or from indirect driver behavior such as
running late causing the driver to alter his or her driving style. It is also possible
that this is the result of conscious alterations to driver behavior which then form a
new and sticky habit, a new norm for the individual that is hard to change.
Because this model is designed to explore the question of an asymmetrical
response to prices in a simple context, the sample is restricted to single vehicle
households to avoid complications from intervehicle substitution in multivehicle
households. More significantly, there is a lack of data on vehicle choice options,
which causes the sample to be further restricted to households which do not alter
their vehicle fleet.
Although every attempt has been made to adequately control for endogeneity
regarding the inclusion of fuel economy in the equation, it is possible that there
remains bias in this estimated coefficient. In general, when a household is purchasing
a vehicle, the expected mileage plays a role in the weight given to a variety of
vehicle characteristics, including the fuel economy of the vehicle. This study could
not capture these effects because there is very little information that could provide
insight into the vehicle choice decision made by the household. Even with the year
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the vehicle was purchased an attempt could be made at constructing a feasible choice
set, but this variable was not made available until 2012. There is potential for future
research on this if a dataset can be created with adequate information on the vehicle
purchase. This could then be used to build a structural model which could both
control for endogeneity and allow for changes in the vehicle fleet, providing insight
into long term responses to fuel prices.
Future work should also attempt to clarify the cause of the asymmetry. In
this study several possible explanations are put forward to explain an asymmetric
response to prices and the lack of equivalence between the price and fuel economy
elasticities of mileage demand, however it is not clear which of these stories are the
true cause. Welfare analysis results are complicated by the assumptions relaxed
here and would vary depending on the expected cause of the asymmetry. In order
to conduct an adequate welfare analysis, a clearer picture of why this asymmetry
occurs is necessary.
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Chapter 3: Does the Rebound Effect Vary With Income? A Micro-
data Study
3.1 Introduction
Motor vehicles use a large amount of oil; in 2010 the transportation sector
accounted for 71% of U.S. petroleum consumption, and motor gasoline made up
two thirds of that consumption.1 Oil imports create a national security concern
while the use of fossil fuels generates pollution.2 There are several regulations in
place to deal with this problem, many of which attempt to do so by regulating
fuel economy. The effect of these policies may not be as straightforward as the
policymakers intend, however. As fuel economy improves, the cost of driving a mile
decreases, holding fuel prices constant. The consumer response to the lower cost is
known as the rebound effect, and this study attempts to estimate the magnitude of
this effect.
The literature on the rebound effect can be divided into two separate cate-
gories: those studies that use aggregate data and those that use disaggregate data.
There is a fair amount of consensus among studies that use aggregate data; most
1Energy Information Adminstration (2011)
2National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2016)
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notably Haughton and Sarkar (1996) and Small and Van Dender (2007) converge
on a long run estimated effect of 22%. The disadvantage of aggregate data is the
smoothing of variation that occurs when averages are used. Disaggregate data in-
cludes the variation that comes from looking at individual households, but at a cost;
because this data is at the individual decision level, variables that are exogenous
at the aggregate level may become endogenous, as discussed below. The focus on
household level data within a given survey year that has been most common in
rebound effect studies results in a loss of inter-temporal variation. Studies relying
on disaggregate data have a broader range of estimates, with short run estimates
ranging from 0% to 87%. A notable exception is Greene et al. (1999), which uses
the Residential Transportation Energy Consumption Survey and finds a long run
rebound effect of 23%, consistent with the aggregate data papers. Few of these
papers deal with the effect that income level may have on the rebound effect.
Greene (1992) finds that estimation of a linear model suggests that the elastic-
ity of cost per mile should be decreasing over time as vehicle miles traveled increases.
A Chow test of structural change only weakly supports a change in parameter values
over time; however, cost per mile and income, measured as gross national product,
were the only regressors to show any difference across periods. The Chow test for
stability of the elasticity of cost per mile alone could not reject the null hypothesis
of no change over time. Greene et al. (1999) looks at separate models for households
with different numbers of vehicles. The finding that households respond similarly to
fuel prices and fuel economy across ownership levels provides some evidence against
a relationship between income and the rebound effect, in that the number of ve-
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hicles owned is strongly correlated with income; if high vehicle ownership implies
high income but no difference in the rebound effect, this suggests that the rebound
effect does not vary with income. The impact of income on the rebound effect is not
explicitly tested, however, and the quality of the income data used is poor. Small
and Van Dender (2007) allow the rebound effect to vary with time, income, and the
degree of urbanization through the use of interaction terms. They find evidence that
the rebound effect declines with income, where income is defined as real personal
income per capita. This is the technique I will use to explore the effect of income
on the rebound effect using household income data from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey. Most recently, Gillingham (2014) uses California data and finds that the
rebound effect increases with income, based on separate regressions for different
income brackets. He believes this result to come out of intervehicle substitution
in multi-vehicle households, which he cannot directly observe as each vehicle is a
separate observation with no household identifier available. Gillingham (2014) also
estimated a fuel price elasticity of mileage rather than the fuel economy elasticity
used in this paper.
In this study, I use panel data from U.S. households over the period of 1997
to 2003 to estimate the rebound effect. I instrument to correct for and test likely
endogeneity. Because expected demand for miles may influence the choice of fuel
economy in a new vehicle, there is likely correlation between the fuel economy vari-
able and the error term. If an individual expects to drive long distances, he or she
may purchase a high-efficiency vehicle to reduce costs, or he or she may buy a large
vehicle that is more comfortable than a small vehicle but also likely less efficient.
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Drivers with pro-environmental beliefs are more likely to buy fuel efficient vehicles
as well as making an effort to limit mileage. Living in an urban environment can
decrease necessary mileage through the close proximity of work and errand desti-
nations as well as increased access to alternative forms of transportation. At the
same time, people in cities may buy more fuel efficient vehicles if they opt for al-
ternative fuel vehicles which operate better in the city than on the highway, or the
decreased expected mileage may cause city-dwellers to purchase less fuel efficient
vehicles. By using the instrumenting for the efficiency decision, this endogeneity
should be controlled for.
This study explores the potential for the rebound effect to vary with income.
It is likely that driving becomes an inferior good after a certain level of income, so
that low income groups for whom mileage is a normal good will take back more of
the fuel efficiency improvements. Income may also affect the rebound effect via the
proportion of total driving costs associated with fuel. If wage rates increase faster
than energy costs, time costs will play a progressively larger role in the overall
rebound effect relative to fuel costs.
The model predicts a rebound effect of 17.8% to 23.6% if there is no correlation
between income and the effect. When an interaction term between income and fuel
cost is included, the results imply that the rebound effect decreases with income.
The effect may be large enough to induce not only an increase in mileage, but also
an increase in gasoline consumption for low income households.
Section 3.2 provides more information on fuel economy regulation in the United
States. Section 3.3 explains the theoretical model from which the empirical model is
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derived and explains two common definitions of the rebound effect that are employed
in the relevant literature. This section also discusses the different models that are
derived from these definitions and the assumptions required for the resulting models
to be equivalent. Section 3.4 describes the data; section 3.5 reports the results; and
section 3.6 discusses the limitations of the study and planned future work.
3.2 Fuel Economy Regulation in the United States
For decades there have been laws requiring manufacturers to meet fuel econ-
omy standards. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, intro-
duced in 1975, require car manufacturers’ annual fleets to meet a minimum harmonic
mean fuel economy.3 The Energy Act of 1978 requires manufacturers to pay a Gas
Guzzler Tax on all cars sold that are below a certain fuel economy, currently 22.5
miles per gallon.4 More recently, there have been many regulations encouraging
the use of alternative fuel vehicles which achieve high mile per gallon of gasoline
equivalent. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) intro-
duced several energy related tax credits that provide incentive to improve energy
efficiency, including a credit for electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (PHEVs).5
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2012) “the
purpose of [the] CAFE [standards] is to reduce energy consumption by increasing
3U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2015a)
4U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2014b)
5Internal Revenue Service (2011)
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the fuel economy of cars and light trucks.” If the Jevons paradox holds for personal
automotive transport and the rebound effect is greater than 100%, as proposed by
Brookes (1990) and Khazzoom (1980), then improvements in energy efficiency can
only increase fuel consumption. Even if this backfire does not occur and the rebound
effect is less than but close to 100%, improved fuel economy may create a sufficiently
large increase in VMT that policies encouraging improved fuel economy, such as the
CAFE standards, become an ineffective way to address issues of oil consumption
relative to other demand reducing policies.
Increased driving causes not only increased fuel consumption, but also pollu-
tion and congestion, implying further problems resulting from a high rebound effect.
As driving becomes cheaper with improvements in fuel economy, individuals may
take more trips or drive farther. There may also be substitution from public trans-
portation if the cost per mile drops below the equivalent transit fare. Hymel et al.
(2010) find that congestion increases 11% in the long run after a 1% improvement
in fuel economy. Therefore, it is important to understand the magnitude of the
rebound effect in terms of miles driven as well as gasoline consumed.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Definitions
Many definitions of the rebound effect are employed in the literature. The most
scientifically accurate definition of the rebound effect is the fuel economy elasticity
of the demand for mileage. Fuel economy is defined as MPG = S
E
, where S is miles
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and E is a unit of fuel; most commonly MPG is miles per gallon of gasoline, though
in the case of an alternative fuel vehicle it can be standardized to miles per gallon









If ηMPG(S) > 0, then an improvement in fuel economy will result in an increase
in miles driven. This does not mean, however, that energy consumption will increase.
Note that E = S
MPG










− 1 = ηMPG(S)− 1 (3.1)
Equation (3.1) shows how the fuel economy elasticity of the demand for mileage,
ηMPG(S), also provides information on the effect of a fuel economy policy on fuel
consumption. It is only if demand for miles is elastic (ηMPG(S) > 1) that energy
consumption will increase (ηMPG(E) > 0); i.e. if the elasticity of miles with re-
spect to fuel economy is less than one, fuel economy policies will reduce energy
consumption.
Another definition of the rebound effect that is often used in the literature is
the negative price elasticity of demand for mileage. Let the fuel cost per mile be
defined as PS =
PE
MPG
. Note that a decrease in the price of fuel when fuel economy
is constant should have the same effect on fuel cost per mile as an increase in fuel











Recall that the demand for miles is a function of fuel and maintenance, subject
to a budget constraint. If income and the price of maintenance is held constant, the
demand for miles is solely a function of the fuel cost per mile; S = s(Ps). Then as

































Therefore, −ηPS(S) can function as a proxy for ηMPG(S). This second defini-
tion, ηPS(S), is often used in place of ηMPG(S) because many data sets lack sufficient
variation in fuel economy, MPG. The additional variation given by PE gives greater
efficiency to the estimate of the rebound effect in such works.
In the long run, technological improvements in fuel economy may induce a
household to change their vehicle stock, but the short nature of the panel data used
in this study puts this outside the scope of this work; instead, only short run changes
in utilization as measured by miles driven by a vehicle are explored here.
3.3.2 Theory
According to Becker’s (1965) household production model, individuals do not
derive utility directly from energy commodities, such as gasoline. Instead the de-
mand for energy comes from the demand for energy services, such as transportation,
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which is made up of the quantity of services consumed as well as the quality of those
services. Transportation services are therefore composed of miles traveled, S, and
the attributes of transportation service, A. These attributes can include performance
characteristics, e.g., speed and acceleration, as well as factors such as the prestige
associated with the brand and the comfort of the ride. Fuel economy, MPG, is one
of these attributes. Historically, fuel economy affected demand for transportation
only through its affect on the budget constraint via fuel costs. In the past decade,
however, high levels of fuel economy have become valuable in their own right as
being “green,” has become a consumer preference. Therefore an individual will
maximize a utility function such as
U = u(c, S,MPG) s.t. I ≥ Pcc+ PSS + PMPGMPG (3.2)
where c is a composite good and I is income. The cost per mile is represented as
PS, and can be divided into the fuel cost per mile and the operating cost per mile.
The fuel cost per mile is PES
E
, where E is the quantity of fuel consumed and PE is
the price of fuel; in general this fuel will be gasoline, but I refer to it in this general
way to account for alternative fuels. The operating cost per mile is POS
O
, where O
is the maintenance required to keep the household’s vehicles running. Substituting
this into the budget constraint, the consumer’s optimization problem becomes
maxU = u(c, S,MPG) s.t. I ≥ Pcc+ (PEE + POO) + PMPGMPG (3.3)
where the consumer is choosing the quantity of other goods he or she will purchase,
the amount of fuel he or she will consume, the amount he or she is willing to spend
on maintenance, and the fuel economy of his or her vehicle(s). Miles driven is then
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a function of fuel and maintenance, restricted by the cost of purchasing a car with
that level of fuel economy.
Higher fuel economy typically comes at a higher vehicle cost due to the tech-
nological improvements that go into the development of the vehicle. Therefore, it
is possible that the fuel cost reduction could be matched or even outweighed by
the increase in vehicle purchase price; however, the consumer may place value on
the increase in fuel economy independent of the financial benefits, because of self-
satisfaction at helping the environment, a desire to stop for gas less often, or praise
from society for making such a purchase. In this case, the consumer may purchase a
vehicle for which the purchase price outweighs the fuel savings. If owning a vehicle
with that level of fuel economy is a source of pride to the consumer, they may drive
more to show off the vehicle. Or if the individual is truly of an environmental mind,
they will drive less than a consumer who is otherwise similar. The price of fuel
economy is really representing the price of new vehicles and therefore the price of
all attributes of the vehicle. Although other attributes are not included in the base
specification, some vehicle attributes are included in a robustness check, shown in
Table B.5.
The demands for mileage and fuel economy are separate but related. House-
holds base the use decision on the price per mile, expected gas prices, income, the
price of maintenance, and household characteristics. This results in the vehicle
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51
where Sht is the miles driven by household h in period t, PEht is current gas prices
faced by household h in period t, PEh,t−s is a vector of lagged gas prices which give the
household a sense of the trend of future gas prices, POt is the price of maintenance in
period t and is treated as exogenous, and Xht is a vector of household characteristics.
The definition of fuel economy, MPGht, is less clear in this context; in the case of
a single vehicle household, this will just be the fuel economy of the vehicle, but
in a multi-vehicle household, fuel economy could be measured as a use-weighted
household composite fuel economy.
This study treats fuel economy as a continuous variable. Although a dis-
crete vehicle choice model would be a more complete representation of the efficiency
decision, this paper only estimates the short run rebound effect, and short run ad-
justments to fuel economy are likely to involve changes in driving behavior, such as
driving at slower speeds and accelerating more gradually, and frequency of mainte-
nance, both of which treat efficiency as continuous. This results in the fuel economy
model given in Equation (3.5).
MPGht = f(PEht , PEh,t−s , Sht, Iht, PNVt , Xht) (3.5)
where PNVt is the price of new vehicles in period t, which controls for the decision to
sell a vehicle and replace it with a new vehicle. The price of new vehicles therefore
serves as the excluded instrument and controls for the endogeneity inherent in the
system.
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3.3.3 Empirical Utilization Model
Because the first definition, ηMPG(S), represents the direct influence of fuel
economy on travel, it is a more accurate definition of the rebound effect than ηPS(S),
which includes the price of fuel. The latter definition is equivalent only if households
respond in the same way to changes in fuel economy as to changes in fuel prices, an
assumption which often does not hold when explicitly tested6 and which does not
appear to hold in the results presented later in this paper. Therefore, the former
elasticity should be used to estimate the rebound effect if the data is available to do
so. This can be achieved by regressing the natural log of miles traveled by vehicle i
owned by household h in period t, ln(Sit), against the natural log of fuel economy,
ln(MPGit), as shown in Equation (3.6). The price of fuel, ln(PEiht) and a number
of household characteristics, X, serve as controls.
ln(Sit) = α0 + aMPGln(MPGit) + αPE ln(PEiht) + αMPGy(ln(yht)× ln(MPGit)) + αyln(yht) + αPOPOht + αXXht + νht
(3.6)
In Equation (3.6), αMPG + αMPGyln(y) is the estimate of the rebound effect.
The control matrix X includes urban/rural fixed effects; dummy variables for race,
gender, and various levels of education; the number of children under the age of 18;
the total number of people in the household; and the age of the household head.
Each vehicle is treated as a separate observation; if a new vehicle is purchased, that
vehicle is added to the sample, and if a vehicle is sold, the vehicle leaves the sample.
This increases the number of observations, but does not allow for exploration of
6Wheaton (1982); Small and Van Dender (2007); Linn (2013)
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substitution between vehicles in a multivehicle household. Although the vehicle
purchase and scrappage decisions are relevant to the rebound effect, they are more
likely to play a role in the long run rebound effect and are beyond the scope of this
work.
Income is interacted with fuel economy because theory suggests that the re-
bound effect should fall as income rises. After a threshold level of income driving
is likely to become an inferior good, which should therefore decrease the rebound
effect from fuel economy improvements. Any increase in mileage resulting from
improvements in fuel economy should be small once household mileage passes the
satiation point. Because low-income households are farther from this threshold, di-
rect rebound effects will be higher among low income groups. Higher opportunity
costs associated with time for high income individuals may also cause the rebound
effect to decrease with income. Because energy forms a larger portion of the total
expenditure of low income groups, they are more responsive to energy prices. Thus,
excluding income from the rebound effect results in an overestimation of the direct
rebound effect for higher income groups. Interacting fuel economy and income al-
lows the response to changes in fuel economy to vary with income by taking into
account the negative correlation between time efficiency and energy efficiency.
Vehicle level fuel economy may be a poor regressor if there is insufficient vari-
ation over time; however, a similar model can be achieved by regressing the natural
log of miles traveled by household h in period t, ln(Sht), against the natural log
of household composite fuel economy, ln( total household miles
total household fuel expenditure
) = ln(MPGht).
This model would require that ln(Sht) be solved out of the right hand side of the
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equation. For reasons discussed in Section 3, this work focuses on single vehicle
households, so this method is not used.
An alternative setup involves the second definition, ηPS(S), which uses the
natural log of the fuel cost per mile, ln(PSit), as the key explanatory variable.
Because the fuel cost per mile, PS, involves energy prices there is ample variation
over time. Variation in fuel costs allows PS to vary over time, so there is no need
to aggregate to the household level. This specification assumes that households
respond equally to changes in fuel economy and fuel prices, which does not appear
to be the case in the data used here, so this method is not used in this paper.
3.3.4 Empirical Efficiency Model
Fuel economy is likely correlated with the error term in the mileage equation.
Vehicle utilization depends on the efficiency of the vehicle since the fuel economy
affects the fuel cost per mile; at the same time, the choice of efficiency will depend
on the expected use of the vehicle. An empirical model of fuel efficiency is given in
Equation (3.7). Instrumenting for fuel economy controls for the endogeneity in the
system. The price of new vehicles is used as the excluded instrument.




This study uses the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data from 1997
to 2003. This is a rotating panel that interviews households for five consecutive
quarters, with one fifth of the sample from the preceding quarter being replaced by
a new set of households every quarter. This survey collects information on household
characteristics, as well as detailed information on vehicle characteristics including
make, model, model year, number of cylinders, and type of transmission, which are
then used to merge fuel economy data from the website fueleconomy.gov, which is
jointly run by the Department of Energy and the EPA. Although the rotating panel
of this length does not equate to a true panel over the years included in the study,
it includes both cross-sectional and time-series variation, giving an advantage over
studies looking at only one year of household level data.
There appears to be measurement error in the self-reported mileage variable
included in the CEX. 7 For this reason, I am calculating mileage using household gas
expenditure, state gas prices, and vehicle fuel economy. 8 Because gas expenditure
is only available at the household level, it is impossible to know how multi-vehicle
households divide the mileage across vehicles, so that this calculation cannot be
done for multi-vehicle households. I explored weighting each vehicle using weights
7See Appendix B.1 for more information on the self-reported mileage variables, including sum-
mary statistics and results
8Because fuel economy appears in the calculation of miles driven, bias from measurement error
may be exacerbated. If an observation has a fuel economy value that is lower than the true fuel
economy, then the miles driven variable will also be lower, and vice versa. As a result, there may be
correlation between miles driven and fuel economy that would present an upward bias, indicating
that these results are an upper bound.
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based off of the self-reported variable, but the noise in the self-reported variable was
sufficient to make such weights unreliable. For the duration of this paper, I will
focus on single vehicle households.
Single vehicle households account for 40.7% of vehicle-owning households in
the CEX. It is possible that high income households with only one vehicle are fun-
damentally different from other one vehicle households due to differences in unob-
servable characteristics such as environmental preferences. Therefore, I restrict the
estimation sample to one vehicle one adult households, because it is less unusual for
a one adult household of any income to have only one vehicle. One adult households
make up 54.8% of one vehicle households. Due to difficulty matching the EPA vehi-
cle data with the CEX data, 17,004 observations, or 50.3%, are dropped out of the
initial 33,833 observations.
Although households complete five interviews, only income data and basic
durable information, such as how many vehicles the household owns, are collected
in the first interview. Expenditure data is collected in the following four interviews,
so that only four mileage observations are possible. Less than 1% of the remaining
observations had to be dropped due to an inability to calculate the price of gas
because of missing state data. Vehicles which are reported as being driven less than
100 miles during the quarter are excluded from the sample. Similarly, observations
reporting more than 12,000 miles driven in a quarter are dropped from the sample.
Overall, 3.8% of the remaining observations were dropped because they were outside
of the accepted mileage range. Summary statistics of the remaining sample are found
in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample Using Calculated Mileage
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max
Quarterly miles driven 14,774 3181.39 1932.95 109.25 11992.22
Fuel economy (miles/gallon) 14,474 23.71 4.68 12 51
Household income before taxes ($) 14,474 28,535.15 26,745.65 1 483,288
National index of price of maintenance 14,474 181.32 11.58 161.23 198.3
Lagged expenditure on maintenance ($hundreds) 6,312 1.21 2.75 0 48
Price of gasoline ($) 14,474 1.36 0.21 0.79 1.93
White household head (dummy) 14,474 0.84 0.36 0 1
Children under the age of 18 14,474 0.30 0.77 0 7
Household in an urban location (dummy) 14,474 0.99 0.11 0 1
Age of household head 14,474 48.86 19.64 15.00 94.00
Female household head (dummy) 14,474 0.64 0.48 0 1
Number of household members 14,474 1.30 0.77 1 8
National index of price of new vehicles 14,474 141.35 2.39 136.63 145.40
Highest education of household head (dummies):
High School 14,474 0.26 0.44 0 1
Some College 14,474 0.33 0.47 0 1
College 14,474 0.21 0.41 0 1
Graduate School 14,474 0.10 0.29 0 1
Summary statistics for all one vehicle households are presented in Table 3.2.
Miles driven per quarter, fuel economy, income, and family size are significantly dif-
ferent from the estimation sample. One adult households drive fewer miles per quar-
ter, have higher fuel economy, lower income, and smaller families than multi-adult
one vehicle households. With fewer drivers, somewhat fewer miles are expected; it
is drivers as well as vehicles that create constraints on mileage. The higher fuel
economy could be explained by unobservable characteristics such as environmental
beliefs or distance to work. It could also be explained by lower income if the im-
proved fuel economy comes from owning fewer luxury vehicles or large SUVs. With
only one adult, household income is understandably lower, and families are smaller.
One adult households are also younger, more likely to be female, and more educated
than multi-adult households.
Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics for the entire vehicle owning popula-
tion in the CEX. Note that mileage could not be calculated for the multi-vehicle
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for All One Vehicle Households Using Calculated
Mileage
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max
Quarterly miles driven 25,366 3577.09 2209.50 102.63 11,995.43
Fuel economy (miles/gallon) 25,366 23.32 4.57 12 51
Household income before taxes ($) 25,366 35,981.06 36,505.32 1 610,000
National index of price of maintenance 25,366 181.32 11.55 161.23 198.30
Lagged expenditure on maintenance ($hundreds) 10,996 1.23 2.78 0 48
Price of gasoline ($) 25,366 1.36 0.21 0.79 1.93
White household head (dummy) 25,366 0.84 0.37 0 1
Children under the age of 18 25,366 0.52 0.99 0 9
Household in an urban location (dummy) 25,366 0.99 0.12 0 1
Age of household head 25,366 49.30 19.33 15 94
Female household head (dummy) 25,366 0.53 0.50 0 1
Number of household members 25,366 2.03 1.33 1 12
National index of price of new vehicles 25,366 141.36 2.39 136.63 145.40
Highest education of household head (dummies):
High School 25,366 0.28 0.45 0 1
Some College 25,366 0.31 0.46 0 1
College 25,366 0.19 0.39 0 1
Graduate School 25,366 0.09 0.29 0 1
households so mileage is not included here. All variables are significantly different in
the total population as compared to one vehicle households. As expected, the gen-
eral population has a higher income and larger families than one vehicle households.
They also have lower fuel economy, which may result, again, from the higher income
being used to purchase vehicles such as luxury vehicles and SUV’s which are less
efficient. The differences in the price of new vehicles and the price of maintenance
represent a slight difference in distribution of households over time because they are
national indices. Actual expenditure on maintenance is likely higher because of the
higher income and number of vehicles. Larger families require more vehicles.
3.5 Results
If endogeneity is present, using instrumental variables should control for the
endogeneity bias. The price of new vehicles is used to instrument for fuel economy
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics for Entire Vehicle Owning Population in CEX
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max
Number of cars owned, including vans and trucks 139,399 2.47 1.32 1 18
Fuel economy (miles/gallon) 67,781 22.64 4.78 11 51
Household income before taxes ($) 139,399 59,035.48 51,061.81 1 812,601
National index of price of maintenance 139,399 179.93 11.17 161.23 197.20
Lagged expenditure on maintenance ($hundreds) 104,093 2.39 5.27 0 400.60
Price of gasoline ($) 139,133 1.35 0.20 0.79 1.93
White household head (dummy) 139,399 0.87 0.33 0 1
Children under the age of 18 139,399 0.78 1.11 0 10
Household in an urban location (dummy) 139,399 0.98 0.13 0 1
Age of household head 139,399 49.08 15.39 15 94
Female household head (dummy) 139,399 0.37 0.48 0 1
Number of household members 139,399 2.92 1.50 1 16
National index of price of new vehicles 139,399 141.62 2.28 136.63 145.40
Highest education of household head (dummies):
High School 139,399 0.28 0.45 0 1
Some College 139,399 0.30 0.46 0 1
College 139,399 0.20 0.40 0 1
Graduate School 139,399 0.12 0.32 0 1
in the mileage equation, as the price of new vehicles will affect the vehicle pur-
chase decision and therefore the fuel economy but is not likely to directly influence
mileage. First stage results are presented in Table 3.4. The first column regresses
the natural log of fuel economy on the national index of the price of new vehicles,
income, current and lagged gas prices, all taken as natural logs, as well as lagged
maintenance expenditure and a series of household control variables. The second
column replaces lagged maintenance expenditure with the national index of the
price of maintenance. The instrument is not particularly strong, but endogeneity
is rejected in each specification. Although this may be due to the weakness of the
instrument, without a better instrument at hand, IV estimation will not provide
reliable results, so I assume that fuel economy is exogenous and use median regres-
sions in all future specifications. Median regression is preferred to OLS in this work
because it minimizes the impact of outliers present in these data.
The results of the median regression estimation are presented in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.4: IV First Stage Results
(1) (2)
F statistic 5.7505 0.0165
Observations 6,312 14,474
Partial R-squared 0.0017 0.0000
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reject null of exogeneity? NO NO
Columns (1) uses lagged maintenance expenditure to control for maintenance prices.
Column (2) replace this variable with a national index of maintenance prices. The
results in these specifications indicate that the rebound effect is between 17.8% and
23.6%, which is in line with the literature in which 10% to 30% is a common range
and several papers report estimates around 22%. When the interaction is included
in Columns (3) and (4), the response to a change in fuel economy for households
with very low income rises to 80.3% to 105.0%, indicating a potential increase in
gasoline consumption. These results indicate that there may be substantial takeback
in mileage in response to an improvement in fuel economy for low income households.
The interaction term shows the expected sign; the rebound effect appears to decrease
with income. All specifications includes gas prices lagged one, two, three, and four
quarters, as well as the full set of controls shown in Table 3.1, although they are not
displayed in the table.
The same specifications are then run with the inclusion of an interaction of
income with fuel prices. Inclusion of this variable has little effect on the results,
outside of understandably increasing the magnitude of the fuel price elasticity esti-
mates. The results indicate that low income households respond more strongly to
changes in fuel prices than high income households, likely due to the higher percent-
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Table 3.5: Median Regression Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
ln(mpg) 0.236*** 0.178*** 1.050*** 0.803***
(0.049) (0.033) (0.378) (0.294)
ln(income) 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.334*** 0.271***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.118) (0.093)
ln(income)× ln(mpg) -0.083** -0.062**
(0.037) (0.029)
ln(price of gas) -0.811*** -0.712*** -0.845*** -0.718***
(0.123) (0.084) (0.119) (0.079)
ln(price of gas lagged) 0.224 0.306*** 0.257 0.291**
(0.177) (0.117) (0.174) (0.114)
lagged maintenance expenditure 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003)
maintenance price index 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 6.774*** 6.776*** 4.166*** 4.799***
(0.218) (0.191) (1.225) (0.940)
Pseudo R2 0.1088 0.0926 0.1093 0.0928
Observations 6,312 14,474 6,312 14,474
Standard errors clustered at the household level and presented in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
62
age of the cost per mile that these fuel costs make up. The rebound effect estimates
remain quite high when the interaction of income and fuel economy is included,
although there is no longer an indication of backfire.
Table 3.6: Income Interacted with Fuel Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
ln(mpg) 0.233*** 0.181*** 0.918** 0.797***
(0.047) (0.032) (0.406) (0.277)
ln(income) 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.273** 0.248***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.132) (0.087)
ln(income)× ln(mpg) -0.069* -0.061**
(0.040) (0.028)
ln(price of gas) -1.616*** -1.403*** -1.418*** -1.429***
(0.504) (0.374) (0.441) (0.345)
ln(income)× ln(price of gas) 0.080 0.067* 0.058 0.070**
(0.050) (0.036) (0.045) (0.033)
ln(price of gas lagged) 0.237 0.311*** 0.254 0.298***
(0.175) (0.113) (0.176) (0.115)
lagged maintenance expenditure 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003)
maintenance price index 0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 7.012*** 6.930*** 4.767*** 4.985***
(0.272) (0.212) (1.328) (0.884)
Pseudo R2 0.1090 0.0928 0.1095 0.0931
Observations 6,312 14,474 6,312 14,474
Standard errors clustered at the household level and presented in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robustness checks are included in Appendix B.2.
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3.6 Conclusion
Using median regressions to minimize the effects of outliers and including
an interaction of income and fuel economy, the estimate of the rebound effect is
allowed to vary with income. The rebound effect may be anywhere between 17.8%
and 105.0%, which is large enough for the consumption of gasoline to increase. In
every specification in which it is included, the interaction between income and fuel
economy is negative, implying that the rebound effect decreases with income as
expected; however, the interaction is insignificant in some robustness checks.
Inclusion of additional vehicle attributes increases the estimated rebound ef-
fect, while dropping the highest and lowest 10% of income has little effect on the
estimates independent of income and reduces significance when the interaction is
included. This seems to indicate that the lowest income decile dries most of the
results. Including regional dummies makes almost no difference in the results. By
using current consumption in place of income, the results again increase somewhat,
at 26.7% to 27.9% when no interaction is included and 69.6% to 138.3% when it is
included.
If the rebound effect is larger than 100%, policies that support fuel economy
improvements will actually increase fuel consumption, and even if the rebound effect
is lower, if it is sufficiently close to 100% such policies are ineffective methods of
reducing oil use and pollution. A decline with income would mean that the rebound
effect is lower in more developed countries, making fuel economy policies an effective
tool in the developed world. It is also possible that certain types of fuel economy
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policies will have differential effects. A scrappage program focusing on older vehicles
may help low income families get a better vehicle, but it may also increase oil
consumption, congestion, and pollution. A subsidy for an alternative fuel vehicle
on the other hand is likely to target consumers that are driving about as many
miles as they would want to, so that they will not increase mileage very much upon
purchasing an alternative fuel vehicle. The nationwide, manufacturer focused CAFE
standards likely falls somewhere in the middle of these options.
In the future, I would like to try to better capture the comfort and prestige
of driving certain vehicle models as these are the most likely factors that would
influence the mileage decision. I would also like to look at the equivalence of the
definition of the rebound effect using fuel economy. Recall that a similar model
could be estimated using the elasticity of mileage with respect to the cost per mile
as the estimate of the rebound effect. The fuel prices inherent in this definition
provide more variation, however this definition may not be as accurate as that used
in Equation (3.6) because there is an assumption implicit in this estimation of the




consumers respond equally to an decrease in the price of gas as to an increase in fuel
economy. If αMPG 6= −αPE , then Equation (3.6) is equivalent to an equation using
cost per mile. In the literature, cost per mile is used more often than fuel economy
because of the greater variation in fuel prices as compared to fuel economy. Two
studies, Greene et al. (1999) and Schimek (1996), test and find that consumers do
respond to increases in fuel economy in a equal and opposite way to decreases in fuel
prices; however, Small and Van Dender (2007) test and find that ηMPG(S) 6= ηPE(S).
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In their specification, ηPS(S) is found to be closer to ηPE(S) rather than the more
accurate ηMPG(S). Based on these results, studies which use the fuel cost definition
may have biased estimates of the rebound effect.
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Chapter 4: Historical Cost of Consumer Credit, Interest Rate Stick-
iness and Salience: Evidence from Mail Order Catalogs
4.1 Introduction
Credit card rates, as opposed to the rates of many other forms of credit, were
extremely sticky in the 1980s.1 From 1981 to 1991, the yield on the 3-month Treasury
Bill decreased by 9 percentage points. Over the same period, average finance rates
on 48-month new auto loans and 24-month personal loans issued by commercial
banks decreased by 5 and 3 percentage points, respectively. On the other hand,
average rates on credit cards issued by commercial banks stayed relatively flat at
around 18% APR.2 The insensitivity of credit card issuers to decreasing cost of
funds as well as evidence of their earning supranormal profits implies that they held
market power. However, such market power is puzzling given low entry barriers and
concentration of the industry.3 In light of this, researchers have proposed several
explanations for credit card rate stickiness including search costs, switching costs
and adverse selection.
1For good overviews of credit card rates in the 1980s, read Ausubel (1991) and Calem (1992).
2Rates retrieved from FRED Economic Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
and Federal Reserve Bank Annual Statistical Digest, accessed through FRASER, Federal Reserve
Archive.
3See Ausubel (1991) for evidence of credit card issuer profits.
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In order to further investigate drivers of rate stickiness and their implications
for current credit card holder behavior, this paper looks historically at the adoption
of this style of credit as a popular means for purchasing small dollar retail goods.
Because cost and term information was not systematically collected in the United
States until the 1970s, we create a new dataset of credit terms from credit plans
offered in the major U.S. mail order catalogs of the 20th century.4 As a result, this
study uses a time series of finance rates offered by major creditors of small dollar
loans from the late 1920s to the early 1990s.
Mail order catalogs, as well as other retailers, initially offered credit in the form
of installment plans, a type of “closed-ended” credit. To purchase a good on credit,
a “carrying” charge was added to the cash price of the good and households paid
off this summed amount (minus a down payment) in equal payments over several
months. Between the late 1950s and the early 1960s, catalogs added or completely
switched to “revolving” credit plans. These plans are very similar to today’s credit
cards. Goods purchased with these plans did not incur credit costs if the outstanding
balances were paid off within a specified number of days. After that, purchasers had
to make a minimum monthly payment and incurred an interest charge, both based
on outstanding balance size.
This work calculates finance rates on both installment and revolving credit
plans for varying good prices based on required payment streams. Rates on install-
ment plans that covered all goods in the catalogs ranged from an equivalent of 5
4“Rates on Consumer Instalment Loans”, September 1973 Federal Reserve Bulletin.
5Because APR was not provided until the 1960s, the IRR is referred to as the APR, while the
APR is referred to as the “published APR.”
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10% and 60% APR.6 There are instances when installment plan finance rates de-
creased even without major decreases in interest rates in the general economy. Upon
adoption of a revolving credit plan, each retailer charged 18% APR and held that
rate for at least a decade. Revolving credit was initially cheaper than installment
credit for small purchases; however, with additions of minimum fees and changes in
outstanding balance calculations, pricing between the two types of credit became
comparable. On the other hand, the 18% APR credit price on medium to large
purchases was much higher than those on installment plans.
This paper investigates possible reasons revolving credit rates seemed sticker
than their installment credit counterparts, arguing that several previous explana-
tions of credit card rate stickiness in the 1980s—including switching costs, search
costs, and adverse selection—are not as applicable in explaining revolving credit
rate stickiness in mail order catalogs. This study also argues that the 18% sticky
revolving credit rate was not simply a story of market power or binding usury ceil-
ings, instead it proposes that revolving credit, as compared to installment and other
closed-ended credit, is more effective in diminishing the salience of interest costs in
the price of goods. This work finds evidence of shrouding of credit costs over time in
the catalogs as well as noting that the method of cost disclosure used for revolving
credit requires more cognitive effort to incorporate into a good’s total costs. Hence
rate stickiness can be explained by theoretic models of shrouding prices or prof-
itably deceptive equilibriums, in which it is optimal for firms to hide or diminish
costs rather than compete on them. Such models offer explanations not only for the
6Rates above 18% were only typical of smaller purchases.
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observed revolving credit rate stickiness in the mail order catalog setting, but also
for retailer preference of revolving credit to installment credit and for the decision
of some retailers to concurrently offer installment and revolving credit.
If revolving credit reduces the salience of costs, then, all else being equal, con-
sumers purchase more goods with revolving credit access than with access to equally
priced closed-ended forms of credit. Also, holders of revolving credit instruments,
like bank credit cards, may have more difficulty assessing whether the benefits of
switching to slightly lower interest credit card outweighs any switching costs. These
consumers, therefore, will appear less responsive to small price changes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides back-
ground on the general merchandise mail order catalog industry and its use of credit.
Section 4.3 reviews previous explanations for interest rate stickiness. Section 4.4
describes the constructed data set. Section 4.5 presents the stylized facts found in
the data, assesses the applicability of previous explanation of interest rate stickiness
to the mail order setting, and proposes a new explanation. Section 4.6 discusses the
implication of the findings and concludes.
4.2 Background
Unlike consumers in the late 20th century who could make small purchases on
credit by use of bank credit cards, consumers in the early 20th century depended
on retailers for credit. Retailers used credit to facilitate sales and promote customer
70
loyalty.7 Among retailers that strongly embraced the use of credit were general
merchandise mail order catalogs such as Sears, Montgomery Ward and Spiegel.
Examples of items sold on installment can be seen in the catalogs from the early
1900s. Installment tables that offered credit for categories of goods were published
in catalogs in the late 1920s. Eventually, mail order catalog retailers offered credit
plans for all goods in their catalogs in the 1930s. Many retailers, including mail
order, also offered customers access to charge accounts which allowed customers a
window of time (e.g. 30 days) to pay for a good without incurring any penalties.
Often customers were given charge plates or cards that contained the identifying
information of a customer’s charge account. Eventually, retailers offered revolving
credit in the 1950s and 1960s.
In the installment credit market as a whole, commercial banks remained the
biggest lenders of installment credit, which included automobile financing and per-
sonal loans. However, retailers grew as creditors, contributing to about one fifth of
the total installment credit extended in the 1970s, as seen in Figure C.1.8 Retail-
ers, on the other hand, were the dominant issuers of charge and revolving credit.
However, bank issued credit cards expanded tremendously in the late 1960s, with
19% growth in 1969 and 25% growth in 1970, as seen in Figure C.2. In any case,
at the beginning of the 1970s, retail stores had more cards outstanding and more
credit balances owed than any other type of credit card, making them the leaders
in revolving credit.9
7Mandell (1990)
8All figures for this paper may be found in Appendix C.
9Mandell (1990)
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In 1973 54% of the credit cards in use were retail cards, while bank cards
made up only 11% of the total credit cards in use.10 By 1978, however, 52 million
Americans had at least two bank credit cards and they accounted for 31% of total
credit card spending versus 34% on retail cards.11 Table C.1 shows the use of retail
cards from the “big three” retail companies in 1975; at that time Sears had more
active cardholders than any other credit card source.12 Table C.2 shows the market
penetration of the top five cards in the credit card industry in 1979.
Throughout the 1980s, large retail stores issued far more cards than the banks,
with Sears leading the industry.13 Although retail cards remained more common
than bank cards, the spending and debt on retail cards was lower than that on bank
cards. Spending and debt accumulation on bank cards increased throughout the
1980s, but they peaked in the middle of the decade for retail credit cards.14 By
1988, 12.6% of total consumer spending for all goods and services was charged to






14U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989)
15Mandell (1990)
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4.3 Explanations of Rate Stickiness
4.3.1 Search Costs, Switching Costs and Adverse Selection
Ausubel (1991) and Calem and Mester (1995) offer several possible explana-
tions for the observed credit card rate stickiness of the 1980s. In this section, this
study reviews these explanations. Section 4.5 examines their applicability for the
mail order catalog setting and suggests another explanation based on the observa-
tions presented in that section.
Ausubel (1991) proposes three reasons for credit card rate stickiness: 1) search
costs, 2) switching costs, and 3) consumer over optimism concerning balance repay-
ment behavior combined with adverse selection. Search costs could arise if it takes
time and effort to find banks issuing credit cards at different rates. Switching costs
can come from several sources, such as the time and effort expended in filling out
an application, the emotional toll of receiving a rejection, the annual fee associated
with some credit cards, and the perception that one builds a stronger credit rating
or receives higher credit limits by holding the same credit card longer.
If search costs are present in the mail order industry, credit information should
be difficult to obtain from the retailers studied in this paper. If switching costs are
contributing to interest rate stickiness, we should see long and complicated credit
applications, the presence of annual fees, indication of improved credit terms for
longstanding accounts, and a potential of being denied credit.
Lastly, Ausubel proposes the existence of three types of credit card users:
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credit card users who never incur interest with their usage because they pay off
their balances before the end of the “Grace Period,” low-default credit card users
who think that they are the first type of credit card users but end up borrowing
and incurring interest, and high-default credit card users who know they will be
borrowers and search for the lowest cost credit. The low-default credit card bor-
rowers ignore credit card interest rate information because they do not think they
will incur interest. In this setup, if credit card issuers compete on interest rates,
they will disproportionately attract the less desirable high-default type borrowers
over the more desirable low-default type borrowers. Hence, credit card issuers do
not compete on interest rates due to this adverse selection problem. This theory
would predict that retailers would avoid attracting liquidity constrained consumers,
for example by maintaining moderate down payments and monthly payments.
Calem and Mester (1995) add to these explanations three possibilities that
involve search or switch costs leading to adverse selection. They first posit that
consumers with high search costs also tend to hold high balances. This could occur
if those who are unwilling to devote time for search because of their preference for
leisure also are impatient and value current consumption over future consumption.
Hence, if credit card issuers lower interest rates, they would disproportionately at-
tract individuals with lower search costs and who also will hold less profitable low
credit card balances. This could occur in the mail order industry if credit infor-
mation is difficult to obtain, requiring time and effort to locate the appropriate
payment tables and fee information.
Second, they propose that creditworthy customers are offered favorable credit
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limits by their current creditors based on private information. Hence, these cus-
tomers would face higher switching costs than their less creditworthy counterparts.
Credit card issuers who lower rates would more easily attract the less desirable cus-
tomers. If this theory holds in the mail order industry, retailers should show signs
of extending or restricting credit limits based on private credit information on past
credit transactions. This would indicate that the mail order companies use private
information, such as the frequency with which a consumer pays on time or runs over
their credit limit, to influence future credit transactions.
Finally, Calem and Mester propose that individuals with high credit card
balances have more difficulty switching to credit cards because credit card issuers
cannot identify if individuals are simply moving their current balances to the new
credit card or are planning to accumulate even higher debts, making them higher risk
customers. Due to this asymmetric information problem, credit card issuers reject
potentially more profitable higher balance individuals and accept less profitable
lower balance borrowers. Hence, credit card issuers are less motivated to compete for
customers, but keep rates high for their captive clientele. As with Ausubel’s adverse
selection theory, this would indicate that retailers in the mail order industry should
want to avoid attracting liquidity constrained customers by keeping down payments
and monthly payments relatively high.
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4.3.2 Salience of Revolving Credit Costs
Theorists conjecture that a shrouded prices equilibrium, in which firms do not
compete on the total price of a good, can be supported if there exist consumers
who themselves neglect to consider the full price of a good. Gabaix and Laibson
(2006) model a setting in which base goods come with add-ons (e.g. a printer and
printer cartridges or a bank account and overdraft services). If some customers do
not consider the cost of these add-ons when making their purchase decision on the
base good, then it may be optimal for firms to not compete on the price of the
add-on feature. This would occur if unshrouding leads newly educated customers to
become less profitable to the unshrouding firm by their avoiding of the add-on feature
(and potentially the base good all together). This model predicts that the cost of
credit, an add-on to the retail merchandise, will be overlooked by consumers. As a
result, these costs will become more and more obscured in the mail order industry,
either through more complicated interest rate disclosure or through a simple lack of
information provided openly to the consumer.
In a related model, Heidhues et al. (2016) describe a setting in which a good’s
total price is made up of upfront prices that are understood by all and other prices
that could be ignored by näıve consumers unless unshrouded (e.g. credit cards
with upfront annual fees but more shrouded interest rate costs). Firms compete on
the upfront price, which has a price floor. If the price floor is binding, then firms
will only compete on the shrouded prices if the good is not socially wasteful (i.e.
production costs of the good is below the value people have for the good). However,
76
firms will not unshroud if the good is socially wasteful because consumers will not
purchase the good once they are able to see the total price. So, perversely, socially
wasteful goods are always sold in a profitably deceptive (shrouded) equilibrium. The
model can also support an equilibrium in which sophisticated and näıve consumers
each separate and purchase superior and relatively inferior goods, respectively, and
the existence of the superior good reinforces a profitably deceptive equilibrium of
the relatively inferior goods rather than unravels it. According to this theory, if
the cost of credit is likely to be ignored by näıve consumers, retailers in the mail
order industry should prefer a credit model in which interest rates are shrouded over
one which states credit costs openly, though the model also suggests that it may be
optimal to offer multiple plans at the same time to appeal to both sophisticated and
näıve consumers.
4.4 Data
In this paper we construct a unique panel data set of credit terms from general
mail order catalogs from the U.S. spanning decades of the 20th century. Data was
collected from Sears, Aldens, Montgomery Ward, Spiegel, and J.C. Penney catalogs
and spans Spring 1928 through Spring 1994, though no one company covers that
entire range. We only collected credit data from catalogs when credit covered a
category of goods versus being specific for each individual good. If there were
several credit plans covering different categories of goods, we collected information
from all of them. In the case of installment credit, information was usually disclosed
77
in the form of down payment, carrying charge, and monthly payment tables that
specified the named variables, respectively, for a given range of balance values; see
Figure C.3. For revolving credit, usually only a minimum monthly payment table
was disclosed along with information about monthly charges in fine print; see Figure
C.4. Information from these disclosures allowed us to construct a stream of payments
for varying balance sizes, from the down payment to the final monthly payment. For
revolving credit, this study conducts analysis on a payment stream in which only
the minimum required monthly payment is paid.
From this information we constructed a time series of five variables of interest:
annualized internal rate of return (IRR), first minimum monthly payment require-
ment, interest cost divided by borrowed amount, down payment and APR. The
internal rate of return is defined as the interest rate for which the net present value
of the cash flows is zero; in other words, it is the interest rate such that the cost
of the loan is equal to the expected cash flows. The equation used to calculate the
IRR is shown in Equation 4.1. We multiply the IRR by 12 to annualize it.






The first minimum monthly payment will be equal to all monthly payments
in the case of installment credit. This is not necessarily true with revolving credit
as monthly payments are weakly decreasing with the outstanding balance. How-
ever, the first minimum monthly payment will necessarily be the highest monthly
requirement that a borrower will have to fulfill for the duration of the loan.
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Interest cost is equal to the carrying charge in the case of installment credit.
To determine the interest cost for revolving credit, we add up all monthly payments
in the payment stream and subtract out the cash price of the good. This interest
cost could be thought of as the “carrying charge” equivalent for revolving credit.
For the variable of interest, we divide the interest cost by the borrowed amount
(cash price minus down payment).
Finally, the APR is a credit cost measure that was standardized by the TILA.
This rate was not published in any of the catalogs until TILA became effective in
1969. However, the monthly percent charge that is applied to outstanding revolving
credit balances is the APR divided by 12. Hence, this paper reports the monthly
percent charge multiplied by 12 in the analysis to fill in the APR time series prior to
TILA. IRR and APR should mostly coincide; however, fees and other details given
in the fine print of these credit agreements could often cause the rates to diverge.
It should be noted that the IRR is impacted by loan terms other than the
interest rate, such as the down payment and the loan term. These other terms com-
plicate the comparison; the IRR may increase due to a decrease in monthly payments
which leads to an increase in the length of the payment term. The increased rate
may therefore be associated with an increased ability to pay for liquidity constrained
consumers, so a consumer may be better off with loan terms with a higher IRR but
lower monthly payments. The IRR remains the best single measure of the cost of
credit available, but welfare arguments cannot be made with confidence based on
the IRR alone.
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4.5 Historical Cost of Consumer Credit
Several of the theories presented in Section 4.3 may be dismissed as explana-
tions of credit rate stickiness in the mail order industry based off of some simple
observations. Recall that search costs could be present if credit information is dif-
ficult to obtain from mail order companies, and switching costs could be present if
there are long application processes, annual fees, private information between re-
tailer and consumer, or a chance of being denied credit. Search costs should be
relatively minimal in the mail order catalog setting as credit plan comparison would
only require opening to the credit sections of the catalogs which themselves are re-
ceived in the mail. In general, mail order catalog credit switching costs are also
minimal. Credit applications in catalogs are typically very short (usually encom-
passing half a page) and many times are located on the other side of the product
order form. Furthermore, no annual fees are associated with this type of credit.
Unlike general-purpose credit cards, retailer credit was exclusive to the purchase of
products sold by the retailer and it was not unusual for households to have access
to multiple retailer credit accounts.16 Hence, there would be less of a concern that
purchasing a good on credit from different retailers would lead to a damaged credit
record. Also, though this study does not have information on this, it is possible that
retailers allotted greater “credit limits” to customers with longer (good) histories.17
16In 1980, 83 million Americans held 290.5 retail credit cards. That is, on average, 3.5 retail
credit cards per retail credit card holder. (U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989))
17Since credit terms such as down payments (which were eventually equal to 0 in most catalogs)
were the same for all borrowers, it is more likely that catalog companies offered greater “credit
limits” by either completely approving the printed credit offer or completely denying it. At certain
times, catalogs offered several credit plans with varying liberal terms. Thus, it is possible that cat-
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However, again, there would be no impetus for customers to close one retail credit
account, and with it a good credit relationship/history, in order to open another
retail account. On the other hand, like general-purpose credit cards, there was still
a chance of being denied credit by mail order catalog retailers for both revolving
and installment plans.
Adverse selection resulting from consumer creditworthiness as private infor-
mation, as argued by Calem and Mester (1995) can possibly be applicable to mail
order catalogs in the sense that a customer who has built up a good credit history
with one catalog retailer may be able to purchase more expensive items on credit
from that retailer than from another with whom the customer has no history. In
this way, the customer stays more loyal to that catalog. On the other hand, as previ-
ously mentioned, because retailer credit is exclusive to a specific retailer, households
may already have credit accounts with various retailers at the same time, allowing
them to more easily build credit histories than with general-purpose credit cards.
Furthermore, there are no indications in the catalogs that once a customer had an
approved open account (whether installment or revolving) that there could be in-
dividual restrictions on the maximum amount purchased unless it would lead to an
outstanding balance that was above the maximum amounts printed in the catalog
credit terms themselves.




To understand the applicability of other theories to the mail order industry
requires a more in-depth analysis of the data set. Terms on mail order catalog credit
plans varied with purchase size, typically with higher finance rates associated with
smaller purchases. To simplify the exposition in this section, this paper focuses
on a purchase amount of $300 in nominal dollars.18 Stylized facts in the section
are generalizable for most purchase amounts except for small purchases. Historical
terms of credit for other purchase amounts can be provided upon request.
Figure C.5 presents the annualized internal rate of return for credit plans of-
fered by mail order catalogs. Installment plans are in shades of red and revolving
plans are in shades of blue. Plans that only covered appliances, furniture and other
specified durable goods are symbolized by diamonds, while plans that covered all
goods in the catalog are symbolized by circles. This study shows that costs of credit
during the low-interest rate period of the 1930s and 1940s is comparable in magni-
tude to those found on credit cards during the equivalently low-interest rate period
of the writing of this paper. For example, in 2015 the average interest rate on credit
cards outstanding was 12.09% APR while the average 3-month Treasury yield was
0.05%. In comparison, the rates on installment plans offered by Sears and Mont-
gomery Ward were 10.67% APR and 11.92% APR, respectively, when the 3-month
Treasury yield was 0.05% in 1939.19 Montgomery Ward and Sears started publish-
18Nominal dollars are used to ease comparison over consecutive years. Real dollar figures can
be provided on request.
19For comparison, note that credit provided by mail order catalog retailers is secured by the
underlying goods while that provided by general purchase credit cards is typically unsecured.
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ing installment credit tables in 1928. Rates quickly dropped after the introduction
of these tables. From 1928 to 1940, rates charged by Sears and Montgomery Ward
dropped from 16.36% to 9.52% and 23.59% to 11.92%, respectively. In contrast,
over the same time period, the 3-month Treasury bill yield dropped by only 1.75
percentage points from 1.79% to 0.04%. Figure C.6 and Figure C.7 show that the
decreased installment credit rates are a result of retailers competing on monthly pay-
ment amounts, carrying charges or both. A decrease in either of these two variables
holding the other constant will lower the cost of credit.
During WWII, the Federal Reserve enacted restrictions on consumer credit
that included the setting of down payment floors and the limiting of the length of
installment loans. As a result, Sears and Montgomery Ward did not offer installment
credit for items above approximately $220. When restrictions were lifted at the end
of the War, credit on more expensive items was again offered in catalogs and interest
rates on credit experienced another falling episode. From 1945/1946 to 1954/1955,
rates on installment plans in Sears, Montgomery Ward, Aldens, and Spiegel catalogs
dropped from around 19.48% to 11.11%, 19.48% to 11.11%, 17.72% to 10.51% and
19.97% to 12.70%, respectively. In comparison, over the same time period, the yield
on the 3-month Treasury bill increased from 0.38% to 1.73%. Figures C.6 and C.7
show that the rate drops are, again, driven by a mixture of monthly payment and
carrying charge decreases.
As seen in Figure C.8, Spiegel started offering plans with no down payment
at the end of 1945. The other mail order retailers charged down payments of 10%
or more. Spiegel, in turn, required higher monthly payments than its competitors.
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In the early 1950s, Sears started offering several plans on appliances and other
durable goods with lower down payments and lower monthly payments. For the
majority of the 1950s, neither Aldens nor Spiegel offered equivalently low monthly
payment plans. Montgomery Ward, however, eventually followed suit by offering
plans with lower down payments and monthly payments. Towards the end of the
1950s, both Sears and Montgomery Ward offered plans with zero down payment
requirements. Sears and Montgomery Ward charged higher carrying charges on
these more liberal credit plans. Eventually, carrying charges increased on all plans
as interest rates rose for the economy as a whole. In 1959 and 1960, Spiegel and
Aldens replaced their installment credit plans with revolving credit plans. As can
be seen in Figure C.6, upon adopting revolving credit, Spiegel and Aldens started
lowering the minimum monthly payment amounts to levels comparable to those of
the liberal installment plans offered by Sears and Montgomery Ward. As seen in
Figure C.7, Aldens and Spiegel correspondingly increased the potential amount of
equivalent “carrying charge” under revolving plans. Sears and Montgomery Ward
also added revolving credit plans to their suite of installment plans in 1959 and
1960. J.C. Penney entered the mail order business in the early 1960s, and when it
started offering credit, it only offered revolving-style plans. By the early 1970s, all
mail order catalogs, with the exception of Sears, only offered revolving credit. Sears
retired installment plans in the late 1970s.
One striking feature of revolving credit is the stickiness of the rates. Figure
C.9 shows that all mail order catalog retailers published a rate of 1.5% a month
(18% APR) on their revolving credit plans upon their adoption in 1959 and 1960.
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Revolving credit rates stayed at 18% APR or higher for the remainder of time the
catalogs existed or credit terms were published in the catalogs.20 In the case of
Sears, this was a period of more than 30 years that included more than a decade
of decreasing interest rates in the economy. In the next section, this paper will go
more into depth about possible reasons for this rate stickiness.
To summarize:
1) Rates on installment plans decreased faster than the yield on 3-month Trea-
sury bills during two episodes in the period of study, leading to a decrease in the
spread between the two rates.
2) In the late 1950s and early 1960s, revolving credit was adopted by existing
mail order retailers, and, by the end of the 1970s, none of the retailers offered
installment credit plans.
3) Upon adopting revolving credit, firms that had not previously offered liberal
terms under installment plans lowered their minimum monthly payment require-
ments to more competitive levels.
4) Rates on revolving credit were very sticky, unlike their installment credit
counterparts. Rates on revolving credit were, generally, 18% APR or above, even
over periods when most other interest rates in the economy were falling.
20Aldens charged a rates of 12% APR when outstanding balances were above $350. In the early
1960s and again in 1974, Montgomery Ward charged 12% APR when outstanding balances were
above $500. From 1965 to 1973, J.C. Penney offered a revolving credit plan for durable goods that
charged 14.4% APR for most outstanding balance amounts (though for a period they charged 18%
APR when outstanding balances were lower than $90). From 1969 to 1973, J.C. Penney charged
12% APR on both revolving credit plans when outstanding balances were above $500. In a few
states in the 1960s and more states in the 1970s, retail store credit fell under usury laws. Thus,
in some states, rates on revolving credit plans were under 18% APR depending on the level of the
state’s usury ceiling.
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4.5.2 Application of Adverse Selection Explanations
It seems unlikely that Ausubel’s adverse selection explanation regarding the
different types of credit card users applies in the mail order catalog setting. Recall
that this theory predicts that retailers will avoid attracting liquidity constrained
consumers; however, mail order catalog retailers lowered minimum monthly payment
requirements on their revolving plans while maintaining the interest rate of 18%
over significant periods of time. Lowering minimum monthly payment requirements
could reasonably disproportionately attract more liquidity constrained individuals.
On the other hand, it is true that if catalog retailers lowered interest rates, they
would lose interest income on revolving credit customers who underestimate their
probability of becoming borrowers. However, the 18% APR on revolving credit may
discourage certain customers from borrowing (or even purchasing goods) who would
have borrowed under the cheaper (though less liberal) terms of installment plans.
These customers would realize that even if they pay the same (higher) monthly
payments as required by the older installment plans, they would take longer to pay
off their loans and they would incur a higher equivalent of a “carrying charge.”
Hence, mail order companies will not compete on interest rates if the gains from
irrational revolving credit users outweigh the losses from low-default risk borrowers
who find revolving credit too expensive.
Calem and Mester’s argument regarding high balance users facing higher
switching costs is also an imperfect fit in the mail order setting. This theory also
suggested that retailers would avoid liquidity constrained consumers. It is unclear in
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this study period whether a customer’s credit balance information with one retailer
was accessible to other retailers.21 In fact, with less accessible credit information,
retailers would face larger asymmetric information obstacles than credit card issuers
in the 1980s. However, as mentioned previously, retailers’ behavior of setting down
payments to 0 and lowering minimum monthly payments requirements would in-
dicate that they were not trying to dissuade liquidity constrained (and potentially
higher risk) individuals from applying for credit. Finally, all of Calem and Mester’s
explanations of rate stickiness should be just as applicable to installment credit as
to revolving credit.
To summarize, search costs should have been minimal in the mail order catalog
setting. Some types of switching costs possibly existed and could account for some
of the credit cost stickiness in catalogs; however, since these costs would exist for
both revolving and installment credit plans, they could not explain the variation of
rate stickiness between the two credit types. Adverse selection explanations for rate
stickiness seem to be at odds with retailers’ offering of more liberal terms through
time. On the other hand, consumer time-inconsistency or over-optimism concerning
the level of debt that will be carried with revolving credit can explain mail order
catalog retailer hesitancy to compete on credit costs.
21Credit reporting agencies did not get computerized until the 1970s, which is when they started
to aggregate information nationally (Furletti, 2002).
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4.5.3 Application of Salience Explanations
Along with the previous explanation, this paper proposes that revolving credit
rates are stickier than those on closed-ended credit because revolving credit more
successfully reduces the salience of credit costs in the price of goods.
The model presented by Gabaix and Laibson (2006) fits nicely in the mail order
retailer setting in which credit is an add-on to the merchandise purchased. Recall
that this model predicts that retailers will attempt to hide the cost of credit. There
are signs of gradual shrouding of credit costs in the catalogs. Initially, when install-
ment credit was introduced in catalogs, a cash price and a credit price were printed
side by side (along with other credit terms) near the advertised product. Later,
installment tables clearly featured the carrying charges that were to be added to
order balances. In some early catalogs, customers had to add carrying charges to
cash prices themselves when filling out the catalog order forms. In all these cases,
credit costs were explicitly integrated into the price of purchased goods. Eventually,
order forms stopped including an area for customers to do the previously mentioned
calculation and instead only included a box that customers could check to indicate
their desire to purchase on credit. Under revolving credit, costs of credit on the main
catalog pages that explained credit plans became more obscured. Revolving credit
tables in catalogs only emphasized “low” minimum monthly payment requirements
for associated outstanding balance amounts and advertising in catalogs focused on
the buying power of these plans. Information on costs, specifically the monthly
percentage charge on outstanding balances, was now located in fine print of cata-
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logs. At most, main text in the catalog alluded to “a low monthly charge” when
referencing credit costs.
The model developed by Heidhues et al. (2016) presents an explanation of why
mail order catalog retailers who were not offering the most competitive installment
terms preferred switching to the more shrouded credit innovation of revolving credit
over offering more transparent installment credit with higher carrying charges but
lower monthly payments. This model predicts that firms will not compete on any
delayed or hidden costs, such as the cost of credit on top of the cash price of the
merchandise. It also suggested that multiple goods, in this case credit plans, could
be offered if some consumers were sophisticated and others were not. If revolving
credit plans were indeed relatively inferior to installment credit or if they were
socially wasteful, then the implied necessary existence of a profitably deceptive
equilibrium could explain why more firms adopted and replaced their installment
credit plans with revolving credit plans. Furthermore, the model can also explain
why Sears continued to offer both the superior installment plan, which could attract
sophisticated customers, as well as revolving credit plans.
Other than the de-emphasis of credit costs in catalogs through use of fine print,
diminished salience of credit costs with revolving credit can also come from the in-
creased cognitive effort consumers must exert in order to translate the monthly or
annual percentage charge into the total price of a good. Researchers have found
instances when consumers are more responsive to all inclusive price postings than
posts where parts of the price are quoted in percent form. This occurs even when
costs associated with the percent quoting will be paid with certainty within minutes
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of the purchase decision.22 In the mail order catalog setting, revolving credit posits
a much more complicated computation with greater levels of uncertainty, balance-
varying minimum payment constraints, and many possible streams of payments over
longer periods of time. In fact, Gabaix and Laibson (2006, pg. 528) assume that,
“consumers show a relatively muted response to complex, contingent, camouflaged,
distant, or disaggregated costs.”
4.5.4 Other Explanations
There are other possible explanations for the rate stickiness of revolving credit
in the mail order catalog setting. Unlike the bank credit card market, the mail order
catalog market did not include as many players and did potentially have high barriers
to entry. Hence, price competition might be muted by market power. However, this
study argues that enough competitive pressure existed in this setting to encourage
some competition with installment credit prices. Furthermore, though some of the
mail order retailers exited the market in the 1980s, it is exactly the time when bank
credit cards emerged as strong alternatives to retail credit. Hence, this paper argues
that a simple market power explanation does not completely explain the observed
rate stickiness.
Another possible source of rate stickiness is binding usury ceilings. This cer-
tainly could have been the case in the late 1970s and early 1980s when interest
rates in the economy were very high. However, the stickiness of revolving credit
rates started almost 20 years earlier when this type of credit first appeared in the
22Chetty et al. (2009)
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catalogs and when usury regulation was only beginning to be applied to it. As
noted by Curran (1967), most states did not consider retail credit to be under usury
regulation before 1957. This is because the courts viewed goods sold on credit as
being sold at a different price than cash price, which was not illegal. However, with
the prevalence of credit use, lawsuits emerged claiming usury violations that led to
the enactment of stricter regulations on retail credit in some states throughout the
1960s. If these usury ceilings were in fact binding, then rationing of credit should
occur. Though this study does not have information on credit application rejections
or credit account closures for the mail order catalog retailers, there is information
on credit terms. As seen in Figure C.6, in the 1960s, when retail credit regulation
became more stringent and interest rates were not decreasing, revolving credit terms
became more liberal while the posted rate stayed fixed at 18% APR. Since more
liberal terms should attract more liquidity constrained individuals, it seems unlikely
that firms were facing binding rate ceilings. Alternatively, firms could have used the
newly applicable ceilings to facilitate tacit collusion.23
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
If revolving credit reduces the salience of interest costs in the price of goods,
then, all else being equal, consumers purchase more goods with revolving credit
access than with access to equally priced closed-ended forms of credit. Hence, access
to credit cards would lead to overconsumption even if consumers do not posses
23Knittel and Stango (2003)
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present-biased preferences.
Another implication of low salience of revolving credit costs is that holders
of revolving credit instruments, like bank credit cards, may have more difficulty
assessing whether the benefits of switching to slightly lower interest credit cards
outweigh any switching costs. Hence, these consumers will be less responsive to
small price changes. This may explain some of the stickiness of bank credit card
rates in the 1980s and as well as the popularity of credit card offers with extremely
low introductory rates.
Regulators who want to minimize these impacts may want to increase the
salience of credit card and other revolving credit costs. However, this task is not
easy. For example, TILA mandated the disclosure of APR. It also mandated the
disclosure of interest costs at the initiation of the contract for closed-ended credit.
However, no equivalent disclosure of interest cost was mandated for revolving credit,
at least at the initiation of the contract. Hence, for revolving credit customers, the
TILA led to the disclosure of almost no new information, other than an annualized
versions of their monthly quoted rate. As a result, Figure C.9 shows that there were
no large changes to the APR of revolving credit plans at the time of TILA.24
The 2009 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act (CARD)
mandated the disclosure of interest rate costs for a credit card holders outstanding
balance if only the minimum payments are paid for the duration of the loan as well
as the interest rate costs if current balances are paid off in 36 months. This type of
24In fact, for smaller balances there was an increase in revolving credit costs at the time of TILA
due to adoption of minimum interest fees and changes in the way monthly outstanding balances
are calculated.
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disclosure is addressing revolving credit cost salience issues more directly than those
in the TILA. Consumers can more clearly see how interest rate costs add up in two
examples on their statement.25 However, these disclosures are presented after the
purchase decision has already been made. Policy that can increase salience of the
cost of revolving credit at the point of purchase would potentially be more effective.
25Agarwal et al. (2014) and Wang and Keys (2014) find that 36-month payment amount creates
an anchor effect. Keys and Wang present evidence that some consumers who were paying their
full balance end up paying the 36-month payment. Furthermore, this disclosure itself might be
shrouded for credit card customers who pay their bills and view their credit card activity online.
These customers would need to open an electronic version of their paper statement in order to
view the disclosure as it is not required to be displayed elsewhere.
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Appendix A: Robustness Checks for Chapter 2
When the fuel economy variable is excluded, the estimated elasticities change
slightly in the fixed effects results, with the price increase estimates ranging from
-0.188 to -0.257, while the price decrease variable increases only very slightly to
-0.080. There is still no statistically significant difference between the price max-
imum and price recovery, and the difference between the price recovery and price
drop is significant at the 5% level. The difference between the price maximum and
price drop coefficient are no longer statistically significant, making the asymmetry
results inconclusive. These results can be found in Table A.1.
The results—including price and fuel economy point estimates, standard er-
rors, and hypothesis test results—are highly robust to the inclusion of season fixed
effects. Including month fixed effects decreases the estimated coefficient on price
maxima by 0.06; this results in a lack of significance in the difference between re-
sponse to price maxima and the response to price decreases. The asymmetry results
are therefore ambiguous, as there is still no significant difference between the two
types of price increases and there is still a significant difference between price re-
coveries and price decreases. The results using a yearly time trend brings the price
increase and price decrease coefficients closer together, but the asymmetry test re-
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Table A.1: Exclusion of Fuel Economy
Dependent Variable: ln(Daily KM driven)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
price max -0.348*** -0.189*
(0.105) (0.108)
price rec -0.412*** -0.256**
(0.117) (0.111)
price drop -0.301*** -0.078
(0.083) (0.082)




# employed 0.091*** -0.029
(0.019) (0.034)
job change 0.069** 0.030
(0.033) (0.047)
car vacation 0.312*** 0.277***
(0.025) (0.030)
population density -0.032** 0.169*
(0.014) (0.095)
car age -0.017*** -0.010*
(0.003) (0.006)








temp min 0.048*** 0.054***
(0.005) (0.005)
temp max -0.074*** -0.074***
(0.003) (0.003)
p rec 0.113*** 0.049***
(0.017) (0.016)




Adj. R-squared 0.208 0.167
H0 : αprice rec = αprice drop p=0.2478 0.0461
H0 : αprice max = αprice drop p=0.6527 0.2194
H0 : αprice max = αprice rec p=0.6325 0.5473
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations: 12,108. Number of Households: 1,552
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sults remain strong, and the fuel economy estimates remain the same. Finally, time
fixed effects decrease all price elasticity estimates, bringing the price decrease es-
timate very close to zero, while standard errors increase only very slightly. Fuel
economy results remain unchanged. These time effect results can be found in Table
A.2.
Table A.2: Time Effects
Dependent Variable: ln(Daily KM driven)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
price max -0.345*** -0.248** -0.291*** -0.207** -0.696*** -0.236** -0.992*** -0.230*
(0.099) (0.104) (0.098) (0.103) (0.109) (0.106) (0.124) (0.122)
price rec -0.345*** -0.271*** -0.327*** -0.278*** -0.647*** -0.268** -0.923*** -0.234*
(0.115) (0.104) (0.115) (0.104) (0.123) (0.106) (0.133) (0.120)
price drop -0.199** -0.035 -0.177** -0.031 -0.445*** -0.032 -0.678*** -0.000
(0.082) (0.077) (0.082) (0.077) (0.094) (0.078) (0.112) (0.093)
ln(fuel economy) 0.545*** 0.534*** 0.549*** 0.538*** 0.532*** 0.533*** 0.537*** 0.536***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027)
# children -0.019 0.031 -0.019 0.031 -0.015 0.030 -0.015 0.041
(0.022) (0.056) (0.022) (0.057) (0.021) (0.056) (0.021) (0.056)
income 0.067*** 0.040 0.068*** 0.040 0.071*** 0.038 0.074*** 0.039
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026)
# employed 0.087*** -0.011 0.087*** -0.009 0.092*** -0.015 0.094*** -0.022
(0.019) (0.031) (0.018) (0.031) (0.018) (0.031) (0.018) (0.030)
job change 0.054* 0.033 0.054* 0.030 0.044 0.038 0.035 0.044
(0.031) (0.038) (0.031) (0.038) (0.030) (0.039) (0.029) (0.040)
car vacation 0.308*** 0.272*** 0.309*** 0.272*** 0.308*** 0.273*** 0.298*** 0.272***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.028)
population density -0.022 0.155* -0.022 0.153* -0.017 0.140* -0.017 0.135*
(0.014) (0.080) (0.014) (0.078) (0.014) (0.080) (0.014) (0.072)
car age -0.013*** -0.009 -0.013*** -0.010* -0.014*** -0.008 -0.013*** -0.007
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
hh size -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.014 -0.016 -0.013 -0.018 -0.002
(0.021) (0.043) (0.021) (0.043) (0.020) (0.044) (0.020) (0.043)
education 0.065*** 0.009 0.065*** 0.009 0.056*** 0.012 0.048*** 0.001
(0.019) (0.036) (0.019) (0.036) (0.019) (0.037) (0.018) (0.036)
rain -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
snow -0.016 -0.012 -0.024 -0.019 -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.011
(0.025) (0.023) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
temp min 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.051***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
temp max -0.080*** -0.078*** -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.079*** -0.077***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
p rec 0.062*** -0.004 0.065*** -0.002 0.061*** -0.003 0.072*** -0.006
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
p max -0.153*** -0.105*** -0.155*** -0.109*** -0.140*** -0.105*** -0.154*** -0.115***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
Constant 3.426*** 3.441*** 3.673*** 3.607*** 3.404*** 3.577*** 3.389*** 3.466***
(0.095) (0.144) (0.097) (0.143) (0.098) (0.172) (0.100) (0.166)
season fixed effect yes yes
month fixed effects yes yes
time trend yes yes
year fixed effects yes yes
Adj. R-squared 0.284 0.258 0.287 0.261 0.287 0.258 0.299 0.261
H0 : αprice rec = αprice drop p=0.1019 0.0051 0.0952 0.0035 0.0246 0.0051 0.0086 0.0054
H0 : αprice max = αprice drop p=0.1453 0.0165 0.2620 0.0470 0.0114 0.0214 0.0030 0.0106
H0 : αprice max = αprice rec p=0.9992 0.8292 0.7772 0.5103 0.6916 0.7637 0.5753 0.9671
H0 : αMPG = −αprice drop p=0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3733 0.0000 0.2606 0.0000
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations: 12,108. Number of Households: 1,552
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The first two columns of Table A.3 show the results of 2SLS regression using
national level Brent oil prices to instrument for fuel prices. These did not make for
good instruments, as seen by the very large standard errors. The second two columns
show the results of 2SLS regression using state average fuel prices as calculated from
the self-reported prices in the German Mobility Panel. In the fixed effects results
found in the last column, magnitudes have not changed much from the original
results, but the standard errors have increased to two to three times their original
size. This indicates that the state-level prices are also weak instruments. This is
probably due to the decomposition of prices; a price maximum at the local level
may not be a price maximum at the state level, for example. The fuel economy
results are unchanged, however, and there remains a significant difference between
the fuel economy elasticity of mileage demand and the fuel price elasticity of mileage
demand during periods of decreasing prices.
I considered using frequency weights based on the number of days between
fillups to control for the fact that households who refuel more often appear in the
dataset more often; however, I feared that they would artificially increase signifi-
cance of coefficients. Frequency weights, which give insight into what the typical
household does on a typical day by treating each day equally, are less compatible
with household fixed effects, and are thus not used in this study, although their
inclusion make little difference to the OLS results.
In the specification using probability weights, in which the weight is the inverse
of the estimated number of times the household refuels in the dataset, the fixed
effect price elasticity estimates increase by 0.037 to 0.059. Standard errors increase
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Table A.3: Instrumenting for Fuel Prices
Dependent Variable: ln(Daily KM driven)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
price max -14.918 -48.627 -0.196 -0.299
(18.930) (285.104) (0.170) (0.198)
price rec 23.258 99.233 0.084 -0.252
(32.078) (592.465) (0.259) (0.292)
price drop -1.307 20.167 -0.170 -0.077
(4.627) (119.109) (0.134) (0.141)
ln(fuel economy) 0.624*** 0.760 0.544*** 0.533***
(0.122) (1.498) (0.025) (0.027)
# children -0.001 1.130 -0.018 0.031
(0.069) (6.489) (0.022) (0.056)
income 0.067 0.136 0.074*** 0.039
(0.068) (0.826) (0.025) (0.026)
# employed 0.135 -0.140 0.087*** -0.012
(0.094) (1.060) (0.019) (0.031)
job change 0.109 1.364 0.053* 0.034
(0.103) (7.704) (0.031) (0.038)
car vacation 0.276*** 0.039 0.307*** 0.272***
(0.081) (1.208) (0.024) (0.029)
population density -0.033 -3.552 -0.022 0.151*
(0.042) (22.279) (0.014) (0.077)
car age -0.024** -0.216 -0.014*** -0.009
(0.012) (1.240) (0.003) (0.005)
hh size -0.033 0.436 -0.011 -0.012
(0.065) (2.607) (0.021) (0.043)
education 0.098 1.239 0.062*** 0.013
(0.081) (7.505) (0.019) (0.037)
rain -0.005** -0.019 -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.088) (0.001) (0.000)
snow -0.070 -0.195 -0.017 -0.012
(0.054) (0.817) (0.026) (0.023)
temp min 0.082 0.236 0.048*** 0.054***
(0.062) (1.128) (0.005) (0.004)
temp max -0.085*** -0.107 -0.078*** -0.077***
(0.024) (0.235) (0.003) (0.003)
p rec 0.347 0.466 0.066*** -0.004
(0.479) (2.948) (0.018) (0.016)
p max 0.630 2.436 -0.157*** -0.099***
(1.064) (15.006) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant 3.183*** 4.556 3.518*** 3.481***
(0.399) (7.874) (0.093) (0.141)
Adj. R-squared 0.280 0.259
H0 : αprice rec = αprice drop p=0.4957 0.8676 0.4353 0.5867
H0 : αprice max = αprice drop p=0.3909 0.8648 0.9067 0.3051
H0 : αprice max = αprice rec p=0.4523 0.8662 0.4015 0.8895
H0 : αMPG = −αprice drop p=0.8813 0.8622 0.0067 0.0015
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations: 12,108. Number of Households: 1,552
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somewhat but significance remains the same or improves in the case of the price
maximum variable. The fuel economy elasticity decreases slightly and the hypothesis
test results are unchanged. These results are shown in Table A.4. The results are
much the same when using the inverse of the liters of fuel purchased as the weight,
although the price elasticity estimates increase slightly more, by 0.061 to 0.085.
These results may be seen in Table A.5.
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Table A.4: Probability Weights Using Estimated Number of Fillups
Dependent Variable: ln(Daily KM driven)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
price max -0.427*** -0.299***
(0.104) (0.107)
price rec -0.423*** -0.328***
(0.125) (0.116)
price drop -0.253*** -0.107
(0.087) (0.075)
ln(fuel economy) 0.526*** 0.505***
(0.022) (0.022)




# employed 0.103*** -0.004
(0.019) (0.034)
job change 0.071** 0.040
(0.035) (0.038)
car vacation 0.319*** 0.262***
(0.027) (0.031)
population density -0.032** 0.167**
(0.014) (0.081)
car age -0.012*** -0.011**
(0.003) (0.005)








temp min 0.047*** 0.046***
(0.005) (0.005)
temp max -0.076*** -0.072***
(0.003) (0.003)
p rec 0.070*** -0.001
(0.020) (0.017)




Adj. R-squared 0.281 0.245
H0 : αprice rec = αprice drop p=0.1049 0.0211
H0 : αprice max = αprice drop p=0.1016 0.0376
H0 : αprice max = αprice rec p=0.9787 0.8061
H0 : αMPG = −αprice drop p=0.0029 0.0000
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations: 12,145. Number of Households: 1,549
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Table A.5: Probability Weights using Liters Purchased
Dependent Variable: ln(Daily KM driven)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
price max -0.452*** -0.347***
(0.106) (0.120)
price rec -0.304** -0.350***
(0.122) (0.132)
price drop -0.160 -0.125
(0.100) (0.099)
ln(fuel economy) 0.519*** 0.487***
(0.027) (0.023)




# employed 0.105*** -0.018
(0.021) (0.034)
job change 0.056* 0.009
(0.033) (0.041)
car vacation 0.389*** 0.306***
(0.027) (0.033)
population density -0.044*** 0.127
(0.014) (0.094)
car age -0.011*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.006)








temp min 0.040*** 0.046***
(0.006) (0.005)
temp max -0.072*** -0.072***
(0.004) (0.003)
p rec 0.095*** -0.003
(0.022) (0.019)




Adj. R-squared 0.275 0.229
H0 : αprice rec = αprice drop p=0.2487 0.0357
H0 : αprice max = αprice drop p=0.0139 0.0221
H0 : αprice max = αprice rec p=0.3084 0.9793
H0 : αMPG = −αprice drop p=0.0008 0.0005
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations: 12,180. Number of Households: 1,552
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Appendix B: Appendix for “Does the Rebound Effect Vary With
Income? A Microdata Study”
B.1 Self-Reported Mileage
The Consumer Expenditure Survey periodically gathers self-reported travel
information; however, the miles driven as reported by the households are highly
noisy, with several nonsensical responses. Table B.1 shows the summary statistics
for the self-reported quarterly miles driven compared to the calculated variable that
is used for analysis above. In both cases, the miles driven goes to unrealistically
high levels, and for this reason the sample is restricted to vehicles which are driven
fewer than 12,000 miles per quarter, but the self-reported mileage variable is clearly
unreliable given the extreme maximum and the large number of observations (1,539)
with an impossible, negative value. The summary statistics for these variables are
repeated in Table B.2 using a sample restricted to the observations in which these
variables take on values between 100 and 12,000. While this restriction in the sample
requires dropping only 4.65% of the observations of the calculated mileage variable,
wholly 26.74% of the observation of the self-reported mileage variable are dropped
with this restriction. The clear flaws in the self-reported variable lead this paper to
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focus on the calculated mileage variable.
Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Mileage Variables for All One Vehicle Households
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max
Self-reported quarterly miles driven 35,282 3056.702 33303.7 -1,600,000 1,603,000
Quarterly miles driven calculated from 30,128 3821.609 3130.738 0 69,842.98
gas expenditure and fuel economy
Table B.2: Summary Statistics for Mileage Variables Restricted Sample
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max
Self-reported quarterly miles driven 25,846 3120.64 2348.98 101 11961
Quarterly miles driven calculated from 28,728 3602.34 2208.52 102.6389 11995.43
gas expenditure and fuel economy
For the sake of comparison, results using the self-reported mileage variable are
given in Table B.4, with summary statistics for the estimation sample given in Table
B.3. Almost none of the estimates are statistically significant and many show an
unrealistic sign.
Table B.3: Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample Using Self-reported Mileage
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max
Quarterly miles driven 7,263 3038.67 2274.31 105 11,500
Fuel economy (miles/gallon) 7,263 23.81 4.65 12 51
Household income before taxes ($) 7,263 29,690.08 27,192.56 3 483,288
National index of price of maintenance 7,263 180.93 11.52 161.23 198.30
Lagged expenditure on maintenance ($hundreds) 5,030 1.25 2.80 0 48
Price of gasoline ($) 7,263 1.36 0.21 0.79 1.93
White household head (dummy) 7,263 0.86 0.35 0 1
Children under the age of 18 7,263 0.26 0.71 0 7
Household in an urban location (dummy) 7,263 0.99 0.11 0 1
Age of household head 7,263 50.93 19.27 16 94
Female household head (dummy) 7,263 0.64 0.48 0 1
Number of household members 7,263 1.26 0.71 1 8
National index of price of new vehicles 7,263 141.42 2.38 136.63 145.40
Highest education of household head (dummies):
High School 7,263 0.27 0.44 0 1
Some College 7,263 0.32 0.47 0 1
College 7,263 0.22 0.41 0 1
Graduate School 7,263 0.10 0.30 0 1
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Table B.4: Results Using Self-Reported Mileage Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
ln(mpg) -0.102 -0.073 0.589 -0.103
(0.063) (0.056) (0.719) (0.728)
ln(income) 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.273 0.060
(0.014) (0.012) (0.217) (0.217)
ln(income)×ln(mpg) -0.067 0.003
(0.070) (0.070)
ln(price of gas) -0.020 0.030 -0.038 0.031
(0.191) (0.145) (0.176) (0.161)
ln(price of gas lagged) -0.213 -0.146 -0.170 -0.155
(0.247) (0.199) (0.230) (0.209)
lagged maintenance expenditure 0.012** 0.013**
(0.006) (0.006)
maintenance price index 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 7.973*** 7.822*** 5.819** 7.910***
(0.279) (0.340) (2.261) (2.291)
Pseudo R2 0.1022 0.1000 0.1023 0.1000
Observations 5,030 7,263 5,030 7,263
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B.2 Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, I run the same four specifications adding in five vehicle
attributes: a dummy for a sunroof, a dummy for a turbocharged engine, a dummy
for a two-door vehicle, a dummy for a convertible, and a dummy for air conditioning.
Results are presented in Table B.5. The inclusion of additional attributes increases
the estimate of the rebound effect, except in Column (4), in which the estimate
decreases very slightly. The same pattern remains in that the rebound effect is
much higher when the interaction between income and fuel economy is included and
the rebound decreases with income. Gas prices remain the main driver of the mileage
decision. The signs on the control variables remain unchanged. Drivers of vehicles
with sunroofs and air conditioning drive more, while vehicles with turbocharged
engines drive less. Very few vehicles in the sample had turbocharged engines, which
may be affecting this estimate.
Another robustness check involves dropping the bottom and top 10% of in-
come. Results are presented in Table B.6. This has little effect on the estimate of the
rebound effect. Independent of income, it ranges from 18.3% to 21.1%. Again, the
rebound effect appears to decrease with income, although the rebound estimates
become insignificant when the interaction is included, indicating that the house-
holds in the lowest decile drive the majority of the results in Table 3.5. It is not
unprecedented to find an insignificant rebound effect; Goldberg (1998) also found
this estimate to be insignificant and concluded that the rebound effect may be zero.
It is also possible that this specification is overspecified.
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Table B.5: Inclusion of Vehicle Attributes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
ln(mpg) 0.386*** 0.326*** 1.410** 0.797**
(0.061) (0.040) (0.563) (0.372)
ln(income) 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.391** 0.217*
(0.010) (0.007) (0.174) (0.117)
ln(income)× ln(mpg) -0.101* -0.046
(0.054) (0.037)
ln(price of gas) -0.950*** -0.859*** -0.937*** -0.850***
(0.130) (0.089) (0.120) (0.090)
ln(price of gas lagged) 0.235 0.423*** 0.287 0.414***
(0.192) (0.132) (0.181) (0.133)
lagged maintenance expenditure 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.003)
maintenance price index 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 6.259*** 6.294*** 2.933 4.780***
(0.249) (0.239) (1.833) (1.211)
Pseudo R2 0.1172 0.1002 0.1179 0.1003
Observations 5,033 11,490 5,033 11,490
Standard errors clustered at the household level and presented in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.6: Dropping Top and Bottom 10% of Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
ln(mpg) 0.211*** 0.183*** 0.435 0.471
(0.062) (0.036) (1.059) (0.696)
ln(income) 0.187*** 0.195*** 0.262 0.285
(0.021) (0.013) (0.334) (0.218)
ln(income)×ln(mpg) -0.024 -0.029
(0.106) (0.069)
ln(price of gas) -0.760*** -0.659*** -0.764*** -0.658***
(0.136) (0.085) (0.131) (0.091)
ln(price of gas lagged) 0.161 0.276** 0.169 0.269**
(0.194) (0.117) (0.197) (0.124)
lagged maintenance expenditure 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.003)
maintenance price index 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 5.860*** 5.776*** 5.145 4.875**
(0.290) (0.227) (3.357) (2.219)
Pseudo R2 0.1200 0.1055 0.1200 0.1055
Observations 5,025 11,444 5,025 11,444
Standard errors clustered at the household level and presented in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.7 presents results in which regional fixed effects are added to all speci-
fications. This has very little effect on the estimates, so that they range from 19.1%
to 23.5% when the interaction term is not included, to 75.6% to 102.1% for low
income households. Again the coefficient on the interaction term is negative. The
estimates appear to be robust to the inclusion of regional fixed effects.
Table B.7: Inclusion of Regional Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
ln(mpg) 0.235*** 0.191*** 1.021** 0.756**
(0.050) (0.033) (0.425) (0.302)
ln(income) 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.317** 0.248***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.133) (0.096)
ln(income×ln(mpg) -0.079* -0.055*
(0.042) (0.030)
ln(price of gas) -0.777*** -0.648*** -0.755*** -0.658***
(0.108) (0.079) (0.107) (0.077)
ln(price of gas lagged) 0.249 0.304*** 0.207 0.306***
(0.165) (0.107) (0.163) (0.110)
lagged maintenance expenditure 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003)
maintenance price index -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 6.723*** 6.960*** 4.219*** 5.175***
(0.213) (0.194) (1.357) (0.984)
Pseudo R2 0.1121 0.0960 0.1125 0.0962
Observations 6,312 14,474 6,312 14,474
Standard errors clustered at the household level and presented in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Finally, current household expenditure is used in place of income. Results are
presented in Table B.8. This results in somewhat higher estimates of the rebound
effect, at 26.7% to 27.9% when no interaction is included and 69.6% to 138.3% when
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the interaction term is included. The interaction is negative, once again indicating
that the rebound effect declines with income, though it is insignificant with the
standard errors having approximately doubled. Using consumption, the model is
slightly better at predicting mileage, as evidenced by the pseudo R2.
Table B.8: Current Consumption Instead of Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
ln(mpg) 0.279*** 0.267*** 1.383** 0.696
(0.043) (0.031) (0.695) (0.424)
ln(expenditure) 0.360*** 0.326*** 0.755*** 0.484***
(0.019) (0.011) (0.248) (0.158)
ln(expenditure)×ln(mpg) -0.127 -0.050
(0.080) (0.050)
ln(price of gas) -0.868*** -0.793*** -0.867*** -0.793***
(0.101) (0.060) (0.101) (0.065)
ln(price of gas lagged) 0.264** 0.346*** 0.266* 0.345***
(0.135) (0.086) (0.141) (0.091)
lagged maintenance expenditure 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
maintenance price index 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 4.636*** 4.788*** 1.131 3.426**
(0.211) (0.181) (2.171) (1.353)
Pseudo R2 0.1428 0.1215 0.1431 0.1215
Observations 7,021 16,331 7,021 16,331
Standard errors clustered at the household level and presented in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
109
Appendix C: Figures and Tables for “Historical Cost of Consumer
Credit, Interest Rate Stickiness and Salience: Evidence
from Mail Order Catalogs”
Figure C.1: Installment Credit Extended (millions of dollars)
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletins, August 1962 and December 1975
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Figure C.2: Charge Account Credit (millions of dollars)
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletins, August 1962 and December 1975
Table C.1: Retailer Credit Cards in 1975
Retailer Active Cardholders Cards Outstanding Charge Volume
(millions) (millions) ($billions)
Sears 21.6 33 7.9
J.C. Penney 10.5 2.7
Montgomery Ward 6.5 2.1
Source: Mandell (1990)








Figure C.3: Installment Terms Table (Montgomery Ward Fall/Winter 1928)
112
Figure C.4: Revolving Terms Table (Aldens Fall/Winter 1964)
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Figure C.5: Internal Rate of Return for $300 Purchase
((a)) Sears ((b)) Montgomery Ward
((c)) Aldens ((d)) Spiegel
((e)) J.C. Penney
Note: Solid black line represents the rate on a 3-month Treasury bill.
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Figure C.6: First Minimum Monthly Payment for $300 Purchase
((a)) Sears ((b)) Montgomery Ward
((c)) Aldens ((d)) Spiegel
((e)) J.C. Penney
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Figure C.7: Interest as a Percentage of Loan Amount for $300 Purchase
((a)) Sears ((b)) Montgomery Ward
((c)) Aldens ((d)) Spiegel
((e)) J.C. Penney
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Figure C.8: Down Payment for $300 Purchase
((a)) Sears ((b)) Montgomery Ward
((c)) Aldens ((d)) Spiegel
((e)) J.C. Penney
117
Figure C.9: Annual Percentage Rate for $300 Purchase
((a)) Sears ((b)) Montgomery Ward
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